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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Models of Scientific Explanation.  (May 2005) 
 
Peter Andrew Sutton, B.A., Southwest Texas State University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert Burch 
 
 
Ever since Hempel and Oppenheim's development of the Deductive Nomological model 
of scientific explanation in 1948, a great deal of philosophical energy has been dedicated 
to constructing a viable model of explanation that concurs both with our intuitions and 
with the general project of science.  Here I critically examine the developments in this 
field of study over the last half century, and conclude that Humphreys' aleatory model is 
superior to its competitors.  There are, however, some problems with Humphreys' 
account of the relative quality of an explanation, so in the end I develop and defend a 
modified version of the aleatory account. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
An explanation is simply an answer to a "Why?" question.  "Why does the sun appear to 
rise and set?"  "Why did you step on my foot?"  "Why do bad things happen to good 
people?"  "Why did that red warning light come on?"  "Why do objects fall to the ground 
when released?"   An answer to any of these questions would be an explanation of the 
fact or event in question.  As the questions indicate, the sorts of facts that need 
explaining can vary greatly, from the minor to the momentous, from the broad to the 
specific, and from the trivial to the significant.  With such a diversity of things to be 
explained, an analysis of the notion of "explanation" would be a vast undertaking indeed.  
I do not plan to offer any such analysis. 
 What I will do, in the present paper, is study the various ways that "explanation" 
is understood within the physical sciences.  By "physical sciences," I have in mind 
primarily physics (in all its many forms), but also all those fields that understand the 
world in purely physical terms.  These include chemistry, geology, astronomy, and 
meteorology.  Biology and medicine, along with such sub-disciplines as genetics and 
neurology, are to be included as physical sciences, but only to the extent that their 
explanations do not involve teleology.  For instance, a proper biological explanation (in 
the sense used in this paper) of a bird's consumption of a particular type of food might be  
______________ 
This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style. 
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that it was genetically predisposed to eat such things, or that it was conditioned by such- 
and-such a procedure to eat such things.  However, it would not be appropriate, for the 
purposes of this paper, to say that the bird ate the food because he "likes the taste," or 
even "in order to survive."  I make no claims about the truth, falsity, or importance of 
such teleological explanations; I simply do not include them amongst what I shall call 
scientific explanations.  So, with these boundaries in place, I think we can reasonably 
expect to be able to develop a useful and consistent idea of scientific explanation, even if 
our notion of explanation in general is too broad to approach.   
 Having said which, there are a number of competing theories of what counts as 
scientific explanation, and there is by no means a consensus within the philosophical or 
scientific communities about which theory is most appropriate.  I will argue, in what 
follows, that Paul Humphreys' theory of aleatory explanation is superior to the other 
theories within the current literature on the subject, but that an important improvement 
needs to be made to it.  Specifically, the way that Humphreys handles the distinction 
between "good" and "bad" explanations has counterexamples, and must be changed in 
order to preserve the intuitive correctness of the theory.   
 Before I start the paper proper, I want to present some of my working 
assumptions and define a few of the terms that will be important. 
First, I am assuming, for the purposes of this paper, that our current best 
scientific theories are, for the most part (and as far as they go), correct.  I am of course 
aware that scientific theories are not set in stone or immune to error, but if we are to take 
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science seriously as a discipline (which I am assuming we should) then we should not 
allow our philosophical theories to contradict it in any serious way.  So whatever theory 
of scientific explanation is most satisfactory had better accord reasonably well (though 
perhaps not perfectly - it is fine to hold science to be in error sometimes) with our current 
best scientific theories.1 
Second, I am assuming that explanations can only be offered for events that have 
in fact occurred.  In other words, I assume that the only “why?” questions that may 
reasonably be asked are those where the statement that needs to be explained is true.  So 
“why P?”  only makes sense when P is true.  If there are any exceptions to this rule, then 
this thesis makes no claim to deal with them. 
Third, I am assuming that there is in fact a best theory of scientific explanation, 
and that it applies equally well to each branch of physical science.  I present a number of 
different explanatory models in this paper, and some might argue that as each has 
different strengths and weaknesses, that each should be eclectically applied according to 
where it best fits, and that there is no one correct way of explaining.  I will not argue 
explicitly against this view, but I am assuming its falsity for the purposes of my 
arguments. 
Fourth, I will be discussing explanation within the physical sciences, but this 
does not mean that our common sense understanding of explanations has no place in my 
arguments.  I will be assuming that the word “explanation” in science does not differ too  
                                                          
1 This is not to say that our theory of explanation should affirm the truth of any particular scientific theory, 
only that it should be useful when applied to such theories.  Our theory of explanation should really be as 
neutral as possible with regard to the truth of any particular scientific claim. 
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greatly in meaning from our ordinary use of the word, even if there are certain minor 
alterations.  If this assumption were incorrect, then scientific explanations would not be 
as interesting and useful to us as they seem to be.  This assumption is important because  
it allows for the use of philosophical thought-experiments in my argumentation. 
As far as my terminology goes, the term “explanandum” refers to the sentence 
describing the event to be explained.  The term “explanans” refers to a sentence that 
explains (in whole or in part) the explanandum.  I will take “explanation” and “scientific 
explanation” to be equivalent terms, each referring to “explanation within the physical 
sciences2,” and all my arguments shall be restricted to explanation thus understood.   
 
                                                          
2 Which are, in turn, defined above. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE STANDARD MODELS OF EXPLANATION 
 
 
In the introduction I said that explanations are usually taken to be answers to "why?" 
questions.  This is a good starting point, but tells us little about what such answers must 
look like, and what makes them good answers.  In this chapter I will present several of 
the standard models of scientific explanation.  I cannot hope to be comprehensive, but I 
think the five models I have chosen are rather indicative of the different types that are in 
the literature.3  First, I will give the basic idea behind each model and present its formal 
apparatus (when applicable).  I will then show the particular strengths of the model in 
question and how it supports our intuitions or supports the practice of science.   
In the end, however, each of these five models has some rather serious 
inadequacies.  Once all the models have been presented in full, I will discuss the 
difficulties that each presents us.  By properly understanding where each of these models 
goes wrong, we can hopefully gain a better understanding of what conditions an 
adequate model of scientific explanation must meet.  In the following chapter, I argue 
that Paul Humphreys’ theory of aleatory explanation meets all these conditions and is 
therefore superior to the alternatives in the literature.   
 
 
 
                                                          
3 For instance, Coffa's dispositional theory of explanation is much like Hempel's I-S explanation with an 
"all other things being equal clause" in the probabilistic law, and Bromberger's account of explanation is 
much like Lewis', but with a less explicit reference to causality.  The only model I am aware of that is 
different in type from those presented here is Bas van Fraassen's pragmatic account, which I go into in 
detail in my chapter on contrastive explanation and the symmetry thesis. 
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The Deductive Nomological Model 
 
 
Carl G. Hempel and Robert Oppenheim, in their 1948 essay “Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation,” developed the Deductive Nomological (D-N) model of scientific 
explanation4, which has been the most influential model of explanation in the last fifty 
years.  The D-N model takes a scientific explanation to be a deductive argument in 
which the explanandum is inferred from some general laws of nature and some particular 
facts relating to the case in question.  The explanans must be empirically verifiable and 
the laws in question must be necessary in order to reach the conclusion.  So a scientific 
explanation has the following form: 
 
(D-N)* L1, L2, …, L r 
 
 C1, C2, …, Ck 
         E 
 
*Where L1, L2, …, L r   are general laws, and   C1, C2, …, Ck are particular facts about the 
case in question.  E is the explanandum event5   
   
This model can be expressed more simply (but less generally) in the following manner: 
 
(D-N) ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx) 
 Fi__________ 
 Gi 
 
 
It might initially be objected that since the simplest deductive argument form of 
all is ‘P ├ P’, and since we already know in scientific explanations that the explanandum 
is true, any event can be given a D-N explanation that is trivially circular.  This would be 
                                                          
4 Carl Hempel and Robert Oppenheim.  "Studies in the Logic of Explanation." 
5 Carl Hempel  "Deductive-Nomological Versus Statistical Explanation."  87-90. 
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a mistake, however, since it was stipulated that a D-N explanation must have a true law 
of nature in the premises that is necessary for the inference to go through.  This implies 
that the explanandum cannot be included amongst the premises, so this form of 
circularity is avoided.   
 The deductive form of a D-N explanation, along with the requirement that the 
premises be true, means that any such account will give us a sound proof that the 
conclusion (the explanandum) is true.  Our best theories (provided that the laws involved 
in them are true), along with the facts about our experiments, are the premises from 
which one can deduce the occurrence of the explanandum.  The fact that it does so by 
the use of some law of nature is what makes this a scientific explanation.  Hempel and 
Oppenheim consider an explanation of this sort to be an adequate answer to any “why?” 
question asked of a deterministic physical system. 
 
The Inductive-Statistical Model  
 
 
 Hempel realized that D-N explanations would only take us so far.  There are 
aspects of the world that we really can only understand statistically, like medical 
explanations (of why certain people became infected with a given virus) and biological 
explanations (of why certain species become the dominant ones in a certain ecosystem).  
Furthermore, there are aspects of the world, like the phenomena of quantum physics, 
which our best science says just are statistical, and are not merely understood 
statistically.  And so Hempel developed what he calls the inductive-statistical (I-S) 
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model to augment the explanatory power given us by the D-N model.  Here is the form 
of the   I-S model: 
 
(I-S)* p(Gx | Fx) = r 
 Fi 
 ======== [r] 
 Gi 
 
This is an adequate explanation relative to a given "knowledge situation" K only 
if r is close to 1 and both premises are contained in K.6 
 
 
 The above model reads basically like this.   As far as we know, the probability 
that an F will be a G is r (which is close to 1), and this i is a case of an F.  Therefore, i is 
likely to be (has probability r of being) a G.  In I-S explanations, the conclusion is not 
deductively implied by the premises, but is rendered highly expectable (given our 
knowledge situation) to degree r.  We cannot show that the explanandum was certain to 
occur, but we can show that it was very likely, given what we know, which Hempel 
regards as an adequate explanation.  However, Hempel realized that we are not quite 
done, and that a further requirement is necessary to make this model acceptable.  
Consider the following example.  John has been infected with malaria plasmodium.  
Generally speaking, the probability of contracting malaria in such a situation is, say, .9, 
and John does in fact contract malaria.  Now consider the following argument: 
 
(A)  p(John contracts malaria | John is infected with malaria plasmodium) = .9 
 John is infected with malaria plasmodium 
 ==================================================== [.9] 
 John contracts malaria 
 
                                                          
6 Carl Hempel.  "Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation." 146-50 
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Or, in symbols: 
 
 p(Mx | Ix) = .9 
 Ij  
 ===========[.9] 
 Mj 
 
  
This is an I-S explanation, as the premises are both contained in K (our knowledge-
situation, which contains relevant statistical information about malaria, in addition to 
some non-statistical information about John's having been infected), and the premises 
confer a high degree of expectability on the conclusion.  As John has in fact contracted 
malaria, it would seem that Hempel would regard this as an adequate explanation of the 
fact.   
But imagine we alter the case somewhat.  Say our knowledge-situation includes 
information to the effect that John has acquired the sickle hemoglobin gene from one, 
but not both, of his parents.  This reduces John's chances of contracting malaria 
considerably, such that the probability he will contract the disease after having been 
infected is, say, .05.  Therefore, the probability of his not getting the disease in the case 
described above is .95.  So let Hx stand for 'x is a heterozygote in regard to the sickle 
hemoglobin gene7'.  Now imagine that John did not contracted malaria.  The following 
argument might be constructed: 
 
(B)  p(¬Mx | Ix & Hx) = .95 
 Ij & Hj 
 =================[.95] 
 ¬Mj 
 
                                                          
7 That is, 'x has acquired the sickle hemoglobin gene from one, but not both, parents'. 
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(B) is an apparently adequate I-S explanation of John's not getting malaria.  (A) is an 
adequate I-S explanation of John's getting malaria.  We could imagine all the premises 
for both arguments being contained within a single knowledge-situation, and both confer 
a high probability upon their respective (mutually exclusive) conclusions.  So the exact 
same body of knowledge can explain John’s getting malaria if he does and explain his 
not getting malaria if he doesn’t.  Hempel sees this as a huge problem.  If an event E is 
probable and explicable in a given knowledge-situation, then it is (according to Hempel) 
unthinkable that ¬E also be probable and explicable in that same situation8.  However, it 
would seem that statistical explanations are full of such peculiarities.  Most objects in 
our universe can be accurately categorized in many different ways.  Within almost any 
class there are many sub-classes, each of which might have different probabilities with 
regard to a given property or event than the broader class.  John is a member of the class 
of all people who have been infected with malaria plasmodium, but is also a member of 
a subclass that consists of those people who have been infected but are heterozygotes in 
regard to the sickle hemoglobin gene.  The probability of contracting malaria in the 
broad class is much higher than in the subclass, and so, depending on which facts we 
look at, we might be lead to believe that he is very likely or very unlikely to contract 
malaria. 
 What Hempel does to resolve this is to restrict what sorts of classes count as 
statistically relevant in our I-S explanations.  He puts a restriction on the I-S model that  
                                                          
8 I agree with Hempel (as I think anybody with a reasonable understanding of probability would) that E 
and ¬E could not both be probable.  It is with his claim that they could not both be explicable that I 
disagree.  See, in particular, my chapter on contrastive and non-contrastive explanations. 
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will make us pay attention to both John's genetic history and the general facts about 
humans' infection with and contraction of malaria.  What he introduces is called the 
Requirement of Maximal Specificity.  The model, with its new condition, looks like this: 
 
(I-S) p(Gx | Fx) = r 
 Fi  
 ==========[r] 
 Gi 
 
Where r is close to 1 and both premises are contained in K, this constitutes a 
probabilistic explanation relative to K only if: 
 
(RMS) For any class F1 for which K contains statements to the effect that F1 is a subclass 
of F and that F1i, K also contains a probabilistic-statistical law to the effect that 
p(Gx | F1x) = ri, where ri=r unless the law is a theorem of probability theory. 
 
 
What the requirement of maximal specificity says, simply put, is that if the thing in 
question (i) is a member of any subclasses of the class we are subsuming it under (F), 
then those subclasses had better not be statistically relevant to the property in question 
(G).  So (A) above is not an acceptable I-S explanation since John is a member of a 
subclass of I (those infected), namely the class {H & I} (those infected who are 
heterozygotes in regard to the sickle hemoglobin gene), and the probability of 
contracting malaria for the member of that subclass is different that it is for the broader 
class.  (B) would count as an I-S explanation, but only if John is not, according to K,  a 
member of any further subclasses of I (or of {H & I}) in which the probability of 
contacting malaria differs from that of the class {H & I}. 
 The additional bit about the law in question not being a theorem of probability 
calculus is meant to address that problem that arises when we consider that we only ever 
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attempt to explain things that are, in fact, the case9.  Because of this, all objects about 
which we offer explanations are members of subclasses of things that have the 
explanandum-property.  This, we shall see, poses a temporary problem for Hempel.  If 
John does not have malaria, we might use (B) as an explanation of this fact.  But 
unfortunately, John is a member of a subclass of {H & I} in which the probability of 
contracting malaria differs greatly from that of {H & I}, namely the subclass of all those 
who do not contract malaria: {H & I & ¬M}.  In the class {H & I & ¬M}, the probability 
of not getting malaria (¬M) is 1.  This is different from the .95 probability of the class 
{H & I}, so it would seem that our explanation (B) is inadequate.  However, the law that 
gets us the probability of ¬M given {H & I & ¬M} is a theorem of probability, so we 
need not worry.  If it weren't for this final unless-clause in (RMS), the only things that 
would ever count as I-S explanations would be trivially circular deductive arguments, 
which would not get us too far when it comes to explanation.  
 
The Statistical Relevance Model 
 
 
Hempel’s requirement of maximal specificity leads naturally into our next model, 
which is Wesley Salmon's Statistical Relevance (S-R) model of scientific explanation.  
Basically Salmon takes maximal specificity (as given by Hempel) to be the important 
aspect of (probabilistic) scientific explanation.  After all, our explanations in this matter 
are statistical, so if we could find the maximally specific reference class for the 
explanandum, we would properly understand its probability of occurring.  This, says 
                                                          
9 Or that are believed to be the case 
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Salmon, is the proper aim of an explanation: to understand the probabilities that the 
causes involved confer upon their effects.  More we cannot ask of any model of 
explanation.   
 The notion of 'cause' came up in the last paragraph.  Causation, as anyone who 
has read Hume will know, is by no means a simple or easily understood subject, and 
many philosophers have been very sceptical about their use in explanation.  In fact, 
Hempel’s theories of explanation were designed, in part, to eliminate talk of causes in 
our scientific discourse.  Salmon's model, as we shall see, is an attempt to bring back our 
common sense notion that causes are important to science and scientific discourse.  He 
writes:  
 
To untutored common sense, and to many scientists uncorrupted by philosophical 
training, it is evident that causality plays a central role in scientific explanation.  An 
appropriate answer to an explanation-seeking why-question normally begins with the 
word "because," and causal involvements of the answer are usually not hard to find10 
 
 
He thinks the best way to discover what the causes of a particular event are is to 
analyze the reference classes into which that event falls.  So an explanatory account 
answers the question "Why does this x which is a member of A have the property B?"   
So, for example, "Why did this man with a streptococcus infection recover quickly?"  
Then the class A must be partitioned into a number of subclasses that are homogenous 
with respect to B.  For a class to be homogenous with regard to property B, all of its 
members must have exactly the same probability of having property B.  So, the class of  
                                                          
10 Wesley Salmon.  "Statistical Explanation and Causality."  p. 80. 
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people who have streptococcus infections is not homogenous with respect to quick 
recovery since it can be subdivided (partitioned) into the class of people who have been 
treated with penicillin and the class of people who have not, and the probabilities of 
recovering quickly vary between the members of these groups.  But the class of people 
treated with penicillin is not homogenous either, since it can be partitioned into the class 
of those who have penicillin-resistant strains of the disease and the class of those who 
don't, and the probabilities involved are different here.  Once all the relevant partitions 
have been made, we can explain why x had property B by citing the homogenous 
subclass of A that x is in (x can only be a member of one homogenous subclass – it 
follows from the definition of a homogenous subclass that they cannot overlap).  So, in 
the case of our man with the streptococcus infection, we might say that he recovered 
quickly because he was treated with penicillin and had a non-penicillin-resistant strain of 
the infection.  As Salmon puts it, a bit more formally: 
 
An explanation of the fact that x, a member of A, is a member of B would go as follows: 
 
P(B | (A & C1)) = p1 
P(B | (A & C2)) = p2  
 · 
 · 
 · 
P(B | (A & Cn)) = pn 
 
where 
 
(A & C1), (A & C2,), …, (A & Cn) is a homogenous partition of A with respect to B,  
pi = pj only if i = j, and  
x ∈ (A & Ck)11 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid, 75 (logical notation changed in a meaning-preserving way) 
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So, to apply this to our streptococcus case: 
 
P(quick recovery | no treatment) = .1 
P(quick recovery | penicillin treatment and penicillin resistance) = .2 
P(quick recovery | penicillin treatment and no resistance) = .6 
 
These three subclasses represent a homogenous partition of streptococcus infections with 
respect to quick recovery,  
no two classes have the same probability, and 
the man in question is a member of the subclass 'penicillin treatment and no resistance' 
 
 
So here we have a good S-R explanation.  Of course, in any real situation the classes and 
subclasses would be far more complicated, but this gives the basic idea. 
 What is most interesting about this explanatory account in opposition to the two 
previous ones is that there is nothing requiring the explanandum to be a member of a 
subclass with high probability of B, or even a subclass that has a high probability of B 
relative to the others.  In other words, if we encounter a second man who has not been 
treated but has nevertheless recovered quickly, we would simply say that he was a 
member of the subclass 'no treatment', and apart from that, the explanation would be 
identical.  As long as we know all there is to know about the man's probability of 
recovering quickly, says Salmon, what would be left unexplained? 
 
When an explanation (as herein explained) has been provided, we know exactly how to 
regard any A with respect to the property B.  We know which ones to bet on, which to 
bet against, and at what odds.  We know precisely what degree of expectation is rational.  
We know how to face uncertainty about an A's being a B in the most reasonable, 
practical, and efficient way.  We know every factor that is relevant to an A having 
property B.  We know exactly the weight that should have been attached to the 
prediction that this A will be a B.  We know all of the regularities (universal or 
statistical) that are relevant to our original question.  What more could one ask of an 
explanation?12  
                                                          
12 Ibid. p. 77. 
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 One result of the possibility of explaining low-probability events is that an S-R 
explanation must not be regarded as an argument for its conclusion.  Explanation goes 
through just fine in this case in the absence of inference.  The intuitive benefits of this 
point will be covered more deeply in my chapter “Explanation vs. Inference.”  
 
The Deductive Nomological Probabilistic Model 
 
 
Another influential model of probabilistic explanation is given by Peter Railton 
in "A Deductive Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation."13  Here he presents, 
as one might guess, a model of explanation that is very much like Hempel's D-N model, 
but that allows for probabilistic explanations, hence it is called the D-N-P model. 
 The basic idea behind Railton's model is that despite our inability to infer 
(deductively or otherwise) unlikely events (such as the decay of a uranium 238 atom in a 
given day) from the facts about the world, we are able to infer the probability they have 
of occurring.  This is a well-known procedure (probabilistic deduction), and is easy 
enough to perform with only basic logic and basic probability calculus14: 
 
1/2 of the marbles in the urn are black 
This is a marble drawn from the urn 
∴ The probability is 1/2 that this marble is black 
 
or, in symbols… 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Peter Railton.  "A Deductive Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation.” 
14 Assuming a single-case propensity view of probability.  This is actually a very controversial point that I 
will not be able to address adequately in this paper.  It is not, however, very important to the theory that I 
endorse what sort of probability one uses, and since I will later give other reasons for rejecting the D-N-P 
model, I will not challenge Railton on this point. 
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∀x(Ux ⊃ P(Bx) = .5) 
Ua_______________ 
P(Ba) = .5 
 
 
Railton takes basically this form of argument as the backbone of his explanatory 
account, with a couple of restrictions. 
 First, like in a D-N explanation, there must be a true law in the premises of the 
argument that is derived from our scientific theory about the event in question.  This law 
will be much like the laws used in the D-N model, and will be necessary for the 
derivation of the explanandum.  The only difference in the nature of this law and of a D-
N law is that it need not be of universal strength.  Hence, "All nuclei of U238 have 
probability (1 – exp(–λ238 % θ)) to emit an alpha-particle during any interval of length θ, 
unless subjected to environmental radiation" is a perfectly acceptable law on the D-N-P 
account. 
 Second, there must be, after the conclusion of each D-N-P argument, a 
parenthetical addendum to the effect that the explanandum event did in fact occur.  This 
might seem like an odd requirement, but remember Railton claims that we cannot give 
arguments for certain explanantia, we can only give arguments for the probability that 
they had of occurring.  Furthermore, Railton, with Salmon, would agree that once we 
know "all the relevant factors" that went into an event's occurrence, we have an adequate 
explanation of that event.  All that is left is to say is that the event did in fact occur 
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(probably or improbably), and so Railton adds this as a mere parenthetical aspect of the 
explanation15.  So here is the D-N-P model: 
 
∀x(Fx ⊃ P(Gx) = n) 
Fa_______________ 
P(Ga) = n 
 
(Ga/¬Ga) 
 
and Railton's main example of its application: 
 
(a) All nuclei of U238 have probability (1 – exp(–λ238 % θ)) to emit an alpha-
particle during any interval of length θ, unless subjected to environmental 
radiation. 
(b) u was a nucleus of U238 at time t0, and was subjected to no environmental 
radiation before or during the interval t0 – (t0 + θ))___________________ 
(c) u had probability (1 – exp(–λ238 % θ)) to emit an alpha-particle during the 
interval t0 – (t0 + θ)) 
 
(u did in fact emit an alpha-particle during the interval in question)16 
 
 
One thing that Railton's model has no need for is a requirement of maximal 
specificity.  This is because the law in the premises must meet all the requirements of a 
law in a D-N explanation.  In particular, the property that it predicates in the consequent 
must be true of everything that meets the description in the antecedent.  If, therefore, the 
law in question is not maximally specific (that is, if the reference class of the antecedent 
can be relevantly partitioned with respect to the consequent), it is simply false.   
                                                          
15 Compare again this view with Salmon's.  In the S-R model we set up an elaborate and complicated 
system of classes and subclasses, but in the end, the explanandum event only gets mentioned with regard 
to where it falls in these classes.  It does not matter what class the event falls into, provided only that it fall 
into one of them.  Similarly, in the D-N-P model, we set up the probabilities involved with x, and then we 
say whether x occurred or not.  The explanation would be a good one whatever happens to be the case 
with x. 
16 Ibid.  125 
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 This lack of an RMS requirement is a considerable advantage to the view, 
allowing it to avoid some of the more serious problems that will be raised later with 
regard to I-S and S-R explanations. 
 
Causal Explanation 
 
 
Going one step beyond Salmon, David Lewis has developed a theory of 
explanation that depends entirely on the notion of causation.  In a paper appropriately 
titled "Causal Explanation,"17 Lewis gives a very simple account of this theory: 
 
Here is my main thesis: to explain an event is to provide some information about its 
causal history.  
In an act of explaining, someone who is in possession of some information about 
the casual history of some event—explanatory information, I shall call it—tries to 
convey it to someone else.  Normally, to someone who is thought not to possess it 
already, but there are exceptions: examination answers and the like.  Afterward, if the 
recipient understands and believes what he is told, he too will possess the information.  
The why-question concerning a particular event is a request for explanatory information, 
and hence a request that an act of explanation be performed. 18 
 
 
This account, unlike any of the other ones mentioned thus far, deals explicitly with 
causation (remember, even Salmon spoke explicitly only of statistical relevance in the 
model, which he takes to be an indication of causation), which, I take it, is necessary 
condition of any satisfactory model of explanation (see Salmon's quote on page 13 and 
my chapter “Explanation vs. Inference”).   
 
                                                          
17 David Lewis. "Causal Explanation," 
18 Ibid. 217-18 
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Lewis's theory is itself based on Sylvain Bromberger's theory of explanations as 
events that can be described by "A explains X to B" (where A and B are both people and 
X is the explanandum-event)19, and like Bromberger's it is far more general than it might 
at first seem.  For instance, an explanation can exist independently of anybody's 
knowledge of it, as the "causal information" that one would provide if one were to 
explain a particular event.  This is how a scientist can meaningfully say "there is likely a 
theory out there that explains this phenomenon, but nobody knows it yet."  In fact, the 
very act of explaining can be performed not just by a person, but also by a hypothesis, by 
certain premises, and by evidence.  On most accounts of causation (on Lewis's, at least), 
this theory would imply that there are a great number (perhaps infinitely many) of 
correct explanations of any particular event.  What determines whether a given 
explanation is a good or useful one is just a matter of the speaker's context.  For 
example, say a baseball strikes and breaks a window.  In this case a scientist studying the 
nature of the baseball's flight could truly say that its speed and weight explain the 
window's breaking, while a scientist studying the strength of the window could truly say  
that its thinness and fragility explain the same event.  In fact the same person might, in 
different contexts, regard different causes as important.  The doctor whose patient 
develops a rash after his penicillin injection might tell the patient that "it happened 
because of the injection," and tell his allergist acquaintance that "it happened because of 
the patient's penicillin allergy."  In neither of these cases, however, would the  
                                                          
19 Bromberger, Sylvain.  "An approach to Explanation.”  
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explanation “because the big bang occurred” be a good one, despite the fact that it 
provides causal information and is therefore and explanation.  Each of the contexts 
forbids mention of such general and remote causes.   
Lewis’s theory is a very loose and general account indeed.  The advantages of the 
looseness of this theory are obvious.  Lewis is easily able to account for explanations 
across a broad range of scientific disciplines, and across a broad range of theories within 
each discipline.  Furthermore, as I mentioned briefly above, the causal nature of this 
account gives it an intuitive plausibility.  If we can cite the causal process which brought 
about a particular event, what more could possibly be asked?   
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CHAPTER III 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE STANDARD MODELS 
 
Each of the above models has its distinct advantages, which I have tried to highlight, but 
each has considerable drawbacks as well.  I will show some of these drawbacks in the 
hope that through understanding them we can gain a clear idea of what exactly is 
required of an adequate account of scientific explanation.  That is, any satisfactory 
account of scientific explanation must avoid all the pitfalls that these models encounter, 
without having any serious problems of its own. 
 
The Problems 
 
 
Problems for Deductive-Nomological Explanations 
 
One deficiency of the Deductive Nomological model is that it fundamentally 
involves laws, and laws are very tricky things to understand.  They are generally taken to 
be logically general empirical statements that contain no singular terms, and that can (in 
principle) be subjected to unlimited tests.  This would rule out any statements that refer 
to particular people, places or things, as well as any statements that referred to particular 
times.  It would rule out such logical truths as the law of non-contradiction and the law 
of the excluded middle term20.  What it doesn't do is differentiate between these two 
statements: 
 
                                                          
20 Which is, of course, a good thing.  Unless we have a Fregean conception of logic as a scientific inquiry, 
we would not want such statements to count as scientific laws.   
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A: "No solid sphere of pure uranium weighs more than 100,000 pounds." 
B: "No solid sphere of pure gold weighs more than 100,000 pounds." 
 
 
A and B both fit the definition given above of lawlike sentences.  Both are presumably 
true, but A represents a law while B does not.  Realistically, we can understand why A is 
lawlike and B is not.  It is because any mass of uranium would reach critical mass and 
explode long before it got to 100,000 pounds, while gold has no such instability.  But to 
give a strict logical formulation of why the first is a law and the second is not is by no 
means an easy task21, and we will need such a formulation before we can confidently 
apply the D-N model.   
 Another problem with the D-N model is simply that it is deductive.  Many 
philosophers (John Stewart Mill being one of the most vocal) hold that deductive 
inferences are epistemically useless since there is no information imparted by the 
conclusion that was not already known in the premises.  If I say to someone '(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ 
P', on this view, then that person has also been told that 'P' (which follows logically), 
whether or not they realize it.  If this view of deduction were true, scientific explanations 
of the D-N sort would indeed be questionable.  What sort of explanation in principle 
imparts no new knowledge on the hearer?  In fact, I think that this view of deduction is 
mistaken.  Would we say that we have no more information regarding the truth of 
Fermat's last theorem now than we did twenty years ago?  No, and yet the proof that gets 
us there22 is entirely deductive.  To take my earlier example, when I first prove 'P' from 
                                                          
21 Such formulations usually involve counterfactuals and other sorts of modal discourse.  But with such 
logical apparatus it can be very difficult to provide consistent, non-circular reasons why A is a law and B 
is not.   
22 Which I will not be including in this paper for a multitude of reasons that will, I hope, be obvious. 
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'(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ P', I have added something new to my body of knowledge, and traversed an 
"epistemic gap."   
 Despite the usefulness of deduction however, it is somewhat odd to imagine that 
science, in explaining the world, is just doing logic or mathematics.  While it is certainly 
appropriate that scientific explanations involve mathematics and logic, it is a more 
dubious claim to say that they just are mathematics and logic.  I am sceptical of any sort 
of explanation that does not essentially involve reference to the process through which 
the explanandum took place, or that merely explains by pointing out that "things are 
always (or usually) this way."  I do not regard the following inference as explanatorily 
helpful: 
 
 All iron rods conduct electricity 
x is an iron rod______________ 
∴ x conducts electricity 
 
 
It leaves me completely unsatisfied as to why my iron rod conducts electricity.  This 
point will be addressed in detail in my chapter “Explanation vs. Inference,” so I will not 
discuss it further here.  Suffice it to say, I consider it a fatal objection to the D-N model, 
and to a number of the models that follow.   
 
Problems for Inductive-Statistical Explanations 
 
 The I-S model of explanation has many of the same problems as its deductive 
counterpart.  I-S explanations, like their D-N counterparts do not seem to add to my 
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understanding of the event in question.  Take the previous example of an iron rod 
conducting electricity and imagine it as an I-S explanation: 
 
 Every iron rod has a probability r of conducting electricity. 
 x is an iron rod.  
 ===================================================[r] 
 x conducts electricity. 
 
 
Where r is close to 1 and both premises are contained in K, and the class of iron 
rods is maximally specific. 
 
 
It just does not seem that this I-S explanation adds anything to my understanding of why 
my iron rod conducts electricity.  Just knowing that most rods have the property in 
question leaves my “why?’ question unanswered.  Construing explanations as 
inferences, deductive or inductive, is problematic, as my chapter “Explanation vs. 
Inference” will make clear.  The more specific problems involved with I-S explanation, 
however, involve its epistemic relativization and the requirement of maximal specificity. 
The severity of the problems posed by the epistemic relativization of I-S 
explanations under RMS is argued for by J.A. Coffa in "Hempel's Ambiguity."23  The 
basic argument begins with the fact that RMS implies that I-S explanations must be 
relativized to a particular person's epistemic situation, and that there are therefore no 
independently "true" I-S argument (which is a characterization that Hempel would agree 
with).  When the fundamental subject matter at hand is a person's epistemic situation, the 
only sorts of useful results we can get are confirmations of certain beliefs (for that  
                                                          
23 Alberto Coffa.  "Hempel's Ambiguity," 
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person) relative to his or her other beliefs.  This notion of confirmation is used all the 
time in both scientific and non-scientific discourse.  For instance, in a D-N model, we 
can speak of the explanation being confirmed by a person's evidence for it, which means 
that they will come to believe it (the explanation) to be true.  And a detective might say 
that certain evidence confirms her in her belief that a particular person committed a 
particular murder, which means she believes (more or less strongly) that it is true that the 
person committed the murder.  In both cases we think of confirmation as strengthening a 
person's belief that a particular claim is true.  But I-S explanations are importantly 
disanalogous.  They are (by definition) not the sorts of things that can be true, so nothing 
could adequately confirm us in the belief that they are true.  What then is confirmed in 
an I-S explanation?  It cannot be the I-S explanation, as we have said.  It cannot be the 
explanandum, since we knew that to be true at the outset.  In cannot be the explanans, 
since the explanans is (by definition) what does the explaining, and for a statement to 
explain itself is viciously circular.  What then does the I-S argument confirm?  In the 
end, Coffa leaves this question open, and until it gets an answer (and I don't have one) it 
does not seem very reasonable to accept the I-S model of explanation. 
 The second problem posed by the RMS is one that will affect not only the I-S 
model, but also Salmon's S-R model (which I shall get to in a moment).  If an 
explanation, to be acceptable, must refer only to the most specific reference class of the 
cause in question relative to the effect in question, our reference classes seem to get very  
small very quickly.  After all, with regard to John's not getting malaria, we cannot put  
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him in the class {H & I & ¬M} since the resulting probability of ¬M would be a theorem 
of probability.  We can however, put him into the class {H & I & J}, where J contains 
information that pertains to John in particular.  The result would be a new reference class 
in which the probability of ¬M is 1 (since John didn't get Malaria), not .95, and so this 
would have to be the reference class that we use in our I-S explanation24.  It might be 
objected that a reference class ought to omit any particular or singular terms, but we 
could get the same results if we just describe enough of John's more general features, 
such as being 6 feet tall, being 21 years of age, having black hair, having type O- blood, 
and so on.  Eventually we would get a description that only John fits that contains no 
singular terms.  It might be further objected that the RMS requirement is relativized to a 
knowledge-situation, but this does not help, since all of these descriptions of John might 
well be a part of that situation (if one were his doctor, say), and we would therefore be 
required to consider the extent to which they affect the probability of getting malaria, 
which they do.  So if we were always required to make the reference class as specific as 
possible, we would usually wind up with "statistical" arguments that confer the 
probability of 1 upon their conclusion, which is a result that is to be avoided, if at all 
possible. 
 
Problems for Statistical-Relevance Explanations 
 
One of the main problems with Salmon's S-R model involves causation.  Salmon 
feels that causation is fundamentally important (as quoted on page 13), but there is no 
                                                          
24 It is important to note that it is not a theorem of probability that the probability of ¬Mx given that            
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mention of causes in the formal explanatory account.  If Salmon were indeed silent on 
the matter of how causation affects his model, this would be a rather serious 
inconsistency, but it is quite clear that, far from ignoring causation, he merely treats it as 
something that can be adequately understood in terms of statistical relevance.  In the 
quote on page 15, Salmon mentions that on his account, we know "every factor that is 
relevant to an A having property B," and wonders "what more could one ask of an 
explanation?"  Well, since the rhetorical answer to this rhetorical question is "nothing," 
and since Salmon himself explicitly requires explanations to cite causes, we can infer 
that he takes statistical relevance relations to be, in some sense, causal.  Clearly, Salmon 
believes that anything that is really causal with regard to B will show up as part of a 
reference class description.  So in the above explanation I think it is intuitively 
reasonable to regard being infected, being treated with penicillin, and having a non-
resistant strain as causes of a quick recovery and, as it happens, each of these plays a part 
in the description of at least one homogenous subclass.  Presumably for any A to cause 
any B, the A must have an effect on the probability of the B.  If this is true, then A must 
have a place in the partitions within our model.  So, problem solved—causation implies 
statistical relevance, so causation is involved with the model.   
 This solution, however, leaves open an important question, "does statistical 
relevance imply causation?  I do not think that it does.  Having a penicillin-resistant 
strain is relevant to the probability of a quick recovery, but we would never say that it 
caused a quick recovery.  On the contrary, we would say that a quick recovery occurred 
                                                                                                                                                                           
x ∈ {I & H & J} is 1, so long as we keep ¬Mx out of the description in Jx. 
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despite the resistance of the infection.  But if statistical relevance does not imply 
causation, how can we tell, using the model, which the causal factors are, or indeed 
whether or not there are any causal factors. 
 The only answer I can imagine is that we might regard those factors that raise the 
probability of B over the probability in the next-class-up could be causes (of B), and 
those that lower the probability of B over the probability in the next-class-up are non-
causal (or are counteracting causes) with respect to B.  This answer is good as far as it 
goes, but it runs into a problem when we try to determine whether "having the 
streptococcus infection" is a cause of "quick recovery."  In all but the most general 
classes of events, the class A (the most general class in our explanation) would itself be a 
subdivision of some broader class C.  If we allow for an analysis of A’s causal role in 
terms of a class C of which it is a subdivision (say, the class of all humans), then we will 
know whether or not A causes B, but we will be left with the further question of whether 
C causes B, and the analysis would go on indefinitely25.  Such an indefinite procedure is 
a problem for Salmon because he requires all the causally relevant factors to be included 
if the explanation is to be a good one.  Another option is to say that the analysis of  
causes must stop at A, but this is too arbitrary a restriction on a causal analysis to be 
taken seriously.  If our explanatory model forbids us from asking whether or not being 
infected with streptococcus can be a cause of a quick recovery, then so much the worse 
for our explanatory model.  Furthermore, such a restriction would allow explanations  
                                                          
25 Unless of course we have in mind a definite stopping point, like “the class of all objects, properties and 
events of any sort,” but such a stopping point is rarely, if ever, to be reached in our statistical subdivisions. 
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that cite no causes whatsoever.  For instance, a man who has a streptococcus infection 
and is not treated, but who recovers quickly.  If we cannot inquire about the causal 
significance of "having a streptococcus infection," then we can have an explanation of 
the quick recovery that cites no causes whatsoever (or only counteracting causes), and 
this is problematic, given Salmon's own statements regarding the importance of 
causation to explanation. 
 Causation aside, the statistical relevance model is basically a non-epistemic 
version of the requirement of maximal specificity expanded and made into its own 
model of explanation.  Fortunately, since the S-R model is not relativized to any 
particular knowledge-situation, Salmon can avoid the objections that Coffa raises to 
Hempel's RMS.  Unfortunately, it is still a version of RMS, and this means that it will 
have the problem of determining when certain description are maximally specific and 
the problem of the overly-specific reference class mentioned in connection with John's 
malaria.  It is incredibly difficult to think of even a simple real-life example where all the 
relevant statistical information is understood (the streptococcus example is, of course, 
grossly oversimplified)26, and even if one could, we would still have the question of why 
the most specific reference class is not the one that describes just the object or situation 
in question, thus rendering all the probabilities involved either 0 or 1.   
 
 
                                                          
26 This objection (that all the relevant statistical information could never be known), which is problematic 
but not fatal to Salmon's model, is one that Hempel is able to avoid by relativizing the explanation to an 
epistemic situation.  It is not necessary that all the statistically relevant information be known for Hempel, 
merely that we apply what we do know properly.  Of course, this opens him up to Coffa's objection. 
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Problems for Deductive-Nomological-Probabilistic Explanations 
 
Railton's D-N-P model is, as the name suggests, basically a version of Hempel's 
D-N explanation.  This means that it is open to many of the same objections.   
First, Railton, like Hempel, makes important use of laws, and therefore takes on 
all the difficulties that they present.  The fact that Railton's laws can be probabilistic 
does not save him from counterexamples like the solid sphere of gold law.  After all, 
universal laws can be given a probabilistic form as follows: 
 
A': The probability that any solid sphere of pure uranium weighs more than 
100,000 pounds is zero. 
B': The probability that any solid sphere of pure gold weighs more than 100,000 
pounds is zero. 
 
Or, in symbols: 
 
A' ∀x(Ux ⊃ P(Wx ) = 0) 
B': ∀x(Gx ⊃ P(Wx) = 0) 
 
 
It does indeed seem that A' is a lawlike statement and that B' is not, but it is by no means 
clear (just as it was not clear on the D-N account) how we are to show that difference 
within the formal apparatus with which we are provided. 
The other problem that the D-N and D-N-P models share is that they are both 
argument-based (inferential) theories of explanation, and therefore, I believe, leave our 
"why?' question unanswered.  Admittedly, the D-N-P model differs somewhat from the 
D-N model in that it does not deduce the fact that the explanandum occurred, but merely 
the probability that it had of occurring.  But being told that the probability of x was n 
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does not seem to help us with the question "why did x occur?"  We are left wanting more 
of an explanation of what went on to bring about x, what process led to x, what caused x.   
 
Problems for Causal Explanation 
 
The primary (and only truly significant) disadvantage to Lewis' theory is its 
looseness.  I mentioned above that this was a particular advantage of his account, but it 
turns out that its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness.  For one thing, such a 
broad analysis of explanation as this one hardly seems like an analysis at all.  Lewis 
explicitly states that he feels it is unnecessary (and perhaps impossible) to offer 
necessary and sufficient conditions on explanations, since our intuitions change 
frequently depending on both the changing contexts of the explanandum and depending 
on our own changing contexts.  But necessary and sufficient conditions just are how we 
analyze terms, and so Lewis must be giving us something a little less exact than an 
analysis, like "this is how we ordinarily use the word 'explanation'." 
I think that Lewis would agree, saying that an analysis is indeed impossible, but 
that it is also unnecessary.  But might it not be perfectly appropriate to give restrictions 
on what may count as a scientific explanation, even if our ordinary discourse is too 
complicated for such restrictions?  Wouldn't it be proper to formalize and regulate this 
particular procedure of science so that we have a clear direction to our inquiry, and a 
good understanding of when success might have been attained?  In the end, Lewis has 
offered us a useful description of our ordinary explanatory discourse, but has not given 
us a model precise enough to apply to the physical sciences. 
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Conclusion 
 
So where does all this lead us in terms of developing a more correct theory of 
scientific explanation?  Well, we will want a model that has all or most of the advantages 
of the models already given and few or none of the disadvantages.   
 So we will want a reasonably rigid formal model that essentially involves 
causation and is able to handle probabilistic explanations.  It ought not involve laws, nor 
should it have any requirement of maximal specificity.  It should make our scientific 
explanations objectively true (that is, not relativized to any epistemic situation) and 
empirically verifiable.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our explanations should 
not be inferential, but rather should really tell us why the event happens (not just that it 
was to be expected).     
 I contend that Paul Humphreys has presented just such a model, entitled 
“Aleatory Explanation.”  In the next chapter I will outline his view and show its many 
advantages to those given here.  In the end, I believe that only a few minor revisions 
must be made in order to render Humphreys’ account the correct model of scientific 
explanation. 
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CHAPETR IV  
 
ALEATORY EXPLANATIONS 
 
 
 
In the last chapter, I outlined several of the major models of scientific explanation in 
order to both gain an understanding of the subject and to identify some of the major 
difficulties with these models and where they lead us.  In this chapter, I will be 
discussing Paul Humphreys' view of "aleatory explanation," which I believe avoids the 
pitfalls of these other views.  As a result, it is a much more useful and realistic account 
of scientific explanation than anything else in the literature.    
 
Humphreys' General Account of Explanation 
 
 
Paul Humphreys, in "Aleatory Explanations,"27 constructs an explanatory model 
that is based entirely on statements of causality.  It is very much like Lewis's theory of 
causal explanation in that it takes an explanation to be something that provides 
information about a particular event's causal history.  But he differs from Lewis in three 
important ways.  First, Humphreys is far more restrictive in his model, and not just any 
statement of causes will do.  Second, context is not relevant to determining the quality of 
an explanation.  Third, his explanatory account makes a distinction between 
counteracting causes and contributing causes.  It seems to me that Humphrey's model is 
the most intuitive and least problematic of all those mentioned here, and my main project 
                                                          
27 Paul Humphreys.  "Aleatory Explanations."  
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throughout the rest of the thesis will be to argue in support of it and examine solutions to 
the few problems that it does have.   
Preliminaries out of the way, the basic (canonical) form of an aleatory 
explanation is: 
 
A because Φ, despite Ψ. 
 
Where Φ is a non-empty set of contributing causes, Ψ is a set, possibly empty, of 
contributing causes, and A is a sentence describing what is to be explained.28 
 
 
The notion of what exactly counts as a cause is by no means an easy issue, as 
Humphreys will agree, and it will of course be necessary to shed at least some light on it 
to make sense of this model.  First, he intends his model to be effective for both 
deterministic and probabilistic causation.  This goes back to a point I made in the 
introduction regarding the adequacy of any explanatory model; it should not, in itself, 
determine the validity or invalidity of any particular scientific claim.  So since the debate 
between determinism and indeterminism (and the related debate between deterministic 
and indeterministic causation) is still a very live and relevant one, it would be 
inappropriate for our model of explanation to assume either side of the issue.  But 
though he remains neutral on the determinism/indeterminism issue, Humphreys does 
give us a general outline of what counts as a cause according to his model.  This is 
necessary because, 1) he needs to defend the idea that there can be multiple causes of an 
event, 2) he must also defend the idea that there can be both contributing and 
                                                          
28 Ibid.  227 
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counteracting causes, and 3) he needs to show how his model can be applied (or is 
already applied) to explanations within the scientific community. 
 
Causation 
 
 
The first thing that must be defined within Humphreys' bare-bones account of 
causation is an 'event'.  
  
 An event is the possession of, or change in, a property of a system on a given 
occasion (trial).  Events are thus taken as concrete, specific entities, actual instantiations  
of or changes in worldly properties of a system, these properties being possessed by 
specific structures, themselves a part of the world, with these structures persisting 
through the change in properties which constitute an event.29 
 
 
Humphreys will only be concerned with causation involving events as defined above.  In 
other words, both the effect and the cause in question must fit the above definition in 
order for the explanation to be acceptable.  While this might seem restrictive, I think the 
definition of an event is broad enough to allow for any sort of causation that would be 
appropriate within scientific discourse.   
 One thing Humphreys' account of explanation (which allows for a multiplicity of 
causes) must argue against is the notion that the only real causes of an event are singular 
causes.  Singular causes are causes that, regardless of other circumstances, always 
produce the same effects.  So if X is the cause of Y, then Y will occur whenever X does, 
no matter what other circumstances obtain.  This idea has a certain intuitive appeal, but  
                                                          
29 Paul Humphreys.  "Scientific Explanation: The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing but the 
Causes."  p. 289. 
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unfortunately, the world is just far too chaotic, and few, if any, such regularities exist.  
Humphreys considers the objection that when experimental controls are place on nature 
(as in a laboratory), certain regularities do become apparent, thus supporting the idea that 
there could be singular causes, but dismisses it as too limiting to the project of science.  
As the goal of science is to explain the world as a whole, not just the world of the 
laboratory, it is unrealistic to confine one's notion of causation in such a way.  Hence, 
when we discuss causes, we must have a looser definition in mind than singular 
causation, otherwise we would always (or almost always) be incorrect. 
 Another apparent difficulty for Humphreys' view of causation is the notion of a 
counteracting cause.  A counteracting cause is, simply, a cause that acts against the 
effect.  The reason this seems like a problem is that we earlier allowed that the causes in 
question be either deterministic or indeterministic.  The indeterministic case seems 
unproblematic, with counteracting causes merely lowering the probability of the event, 
but not ruling it out, but in the deterministic case, it would seem odd to think of anything 
working against the effect without precluding it altogether.  To understand how 
deterministic explanations can have counteracting causes, it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between purely qualitative explanations and quantitative explanations.  Pretty 
much any event can be understood (and explained) in terms of both its pure qualities and 
in terms of the quantitative values of those properties.  Humphreys gives the case of a 
room that is both heated and air conditioned.  Over the course of one hour, the heater 
pumps 10,000 Btu into the room and the air conditioner pumps 5000 Btu out of the 
room, and the net rise in the temperature of the room is 5˚C.  When we ask, "why did the 
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room get 5˚C hotter?" we could be asking why the temperature increased, or we could be 
asking why it increased by 5˚C.  Both would be legitimate explanation-seeking "why?" 
questions, and both are proper within scientific discourse, but the answer would be 
different in each case.  In the quantitative case, our previous intuition would be correct, 
and there would be no counteracting causes.  We would just say "The room got 5˚C 
hotter because of the combined actions of the heater and the air conditioner."  This is 
because, had either of them been absent from the situation, the temperature would not 
have risen by 5˚C, but by some other amount (or not at all).  In the purely qualitative 
case, however, we would say the temperature rose "Because of the action of the heater, 
despite the action of the air conditioner."  In this case, the effect (the temperature rising) 
would have been accomplished without the air conditioner, and in fact, it worked against 
the heating of the room, so it is reasonable to speak of it as a counteracting cause.  What 
this example demonstrates is that while it is often appropriate to speak of counteracting 
causes in qualitative deterministic explanations, it is rarely, if ever, appropriate to speak 
of counteracting causes in a quantitative deterministic explanation.  This is, however, 
unproblematic for Humphreys' view, since the set Ψ of counteracting causes can be the 
empty set.  
 With regard to how his model can be applied to actual scientific explanations 
involving causation, the preceding example is a very good case.  Whatever scientists 
might have in mind when they speak of causation, it would seem that the causes 
mentioned in the heater/air-conditioner case must be included.  Another example 
Humphreys gives is that of a car skidding off the road.  We might say that it skidded off 
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the road because it was traveling excessively fast, the road had a steep slope, and there 
was sand at the intersection, despite the fact that the brakes were good and the tires were 
properly inflated.  Here we have a number of causes (counteracting and contributing) put 
into the canonical form of an aleatory explanation.  Each in definable in purely physical 
terms (velocity, gravity, inertia, friction, and such), and each of them either adds to or 
subtracts from the probability that the car will skid off the road.  Surely there were other 
factors involved (weather conditions, driver alertness, etc.), but despite that, it would 
appear that we have at least a partial explanation of the event in question in terms of 
quantifiable and scientifically understandable causes.  This is, of course, just an example 
of how Humphreys' account of causal explanation matches up to our physical and 
scientific discourse regarding causation.   
One might worry that there is no stipulation that the causes involved in the 
explanation be explicitly of this physically quantifiable sort.  Hempel, for instance, 
would probably worry that this opens up the door to all sorts of pseudoscientific 
explanations of events (astrology, crystals, and the like) 30.  But these fears are 
misguided.  What is stipulated is that any cause of a particular event must either raise or 
lower the probability of that event (for contributing and counteracting causes, 
respectively).  If the position of the stars and the use of crystals have no impact upon a 
particular event, then it would be inappropriate to include such information in our 
explanatory account.  If it turns out that stars and crystals do impact the physical events 
in question (such as cars skidding off the road or rooms becoming hotter), then we were 
                                                          
30 This is one of the motivations behind the symmetry thesis.  See my chapter on contrastive explanations. 
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wrong to think of such things as pseudoscience in the first place, and we should include 
such information in our explanations when relevant.  The point is that it is not up to our 
theory of explanation alone to determine the nature of causation or the proper place for 
astrologers.  Presumably the scientists can be trusted to put the pseudoscientists in their 
place through rigorous experimentation and theorizing.   
However, one might point out that since the stars exert gravitational force upon 
everything in the universe (presumably), they must have some effect upon everything 
that happens.  One might further argue that given the conditions on what counts as a 
cause, this gravitational impact should be considered seriously, and the stars therefore do 
explain events on earth, according to Humphreys.  As the stars clearly do not explain 
such events, we seem to have a reductio on Humphreys' view.   And more generally, 
since most events impact most other events, it would seem that our explanations would 
become hopelessly long and complicated, and would involve many apparently irrelevant 
statements of very weak causal connections, which would, of course be problematic.  In 
order to respond to this objection, I will have to discuss the incompleteness of scientific 
explanations. 
Humphreys takes incompleteness to be a normal feature of scientific 
explanations.  Since our knowledge of the physical world is never quite complete, 
neither are our explanations.  But even if our explanations are incomplete, they can still 
be correct.  Humphrey's gives the following case: 
 
Consider how we would respond to a request for an explanation of the increase in 
angular momentum of the earth over the conserved value.  The explanation would be 
"because of the precession of the moon's orbital plane, the nonuniformity of the sun's 
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gravitational field, and the action of thermodynamical tides, despite the slowing effect of 
tidal friction."…There is no pretense that all causal factors affecting the angular 
momentum of the earth have been cited.  The omissions are not due to the scientist 
selecting those factors which interest his listener, or to being constrained by the form of 
the request for an explanation.  It is because there are many influences on the earth's 
rotation, most of which are as yet unknown.  The geophysicist knows that there exist 
these unknown causal factors, yet the factors cited do provide an explanation, however 
incomplete, of the explanandum.  Nevertheless, the explanation given is true.31 
 
So in the case of our astrological example, it would not be necessary, on Humphrey's 
model, to provide any information whatsoever about the gravitational impact that the 
stars have on earth-bound objects.  If such information (properly sorted into contributing 
and counteracting causes) were included, it would not hurt the explanation (in fact, it 
would help a tiny, tiny bit), but it is not necessary in order for the explanation to be 
correct.  Further, in response to the more general objection that aleatory explanations 
would become needlessly long and complicated, there is no reason to think this is the 
case.  Their length and complexity would (or should) merely reflect the explainer's level 
of knowledge and expertise, which seems appropriate. 
 
Quality 
 
 
Another important feature of aleatory explanations is that they have varying 
degrees of quality.  That is, there can be better and worse explanations of a particular 
event, all of which fit the canonical form, and all of which are true.  This is a feature that 
many of the other models I discussed do not have.  The D-N, I-S, S-R, and D-N-P 
models all have one and only one true explanation of a given event, and therefore there 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  288 
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can be no diversity in the quality of explanations.  Any explanation is either true or false, 
with no middle ground32.  Lewis' theory of causal explanations does allow for better and 
worse explanations, but only relative to a given speaker/listener context.  This, as I have 
pointed out, does not seem quite objective enough for the project of scientific inquiry.  
Humphreys' conditions on the quality of an explanation are as follows.  For any two true 
explanations of a particular event Y (keeping in mind the canonical form of 'Y because 
Φ, despite Ψ'), "If Φ _ Φ' and Ψ = Ψ', then the explanation of Y by Φ' is superior to that 
given by Φ.  If Φ = Φ' and Ψ _ Ψ' then again Φ' gives a superior explanation, in the sense 
that it is more complete."33  
So, simply put34, explanation A is better than explanation B if either A cites more 
contributing causes and the same counteracting causes as B, or A cites more 
counteracting causes and the same contributing causes as B.  I imagine (though 
Humphreys himself never explicitly points this out) that Humphreys would also agree 
that when A gives both more counteracting causes and more contributing causes than B, 
A is the better explanation.  Of course, even with this addition, these are merely 
sufficient conditions on what constitutes better and worse explanations.  Humphreys  
does not give us any way of telling, for any two explanations, whether one is better than  
                                                          
32 Though as I mentioned in the previous chapter, Hempel denies that I-S explanations should ever be seen 
as true, or even "true within a certain epistemic situation."  However, given Coffa's objection, Hempel will 
need to allow I-S explanations to be true or "good" in some sense, or else the view falls into 
meaninglessness.   
33 Ibid.  296 
34 And hopefully not too misleadingly put.  It should be kept in mind that when I say "A cites more causes 
than B" I mean "A cites all the causes that B does, plus some that B does not."  The 'proper subset' 
notation that Humphreys uses is really the best way of expressing this, but is not easy to put into simple 
English. 
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another.  In the case of two explanations that cite different causes, with little or no 
overlap, we are left to our own devices to determine which one is better.  This is entirely 
appropriate.  It should not be up to our model of explanation alone to determine whether 
the car's skid is better explained by "because of its speed, despite its working breaks," or 
"because of the angle of the turn and the sand on the road, despite its properly inflated 
tires."  It is the physicists job to properly sort out the causes and determine which ones 
are most important.  This sort of inquiry is the proper work of science, and there is no 
reason why our theory alone should be expected to replace it.   
It should also be noted that these conditions on the quality of explanations cannot 
be used to determine which explanations are "good" or "bad."  They can only determine 
the quality of an explanation relative to another explanation of the same event.  This is 
not to say that there are no good or bad explanations, merely that such a feature of an 
explanation cannot be determined by analysis of the explanation's form alone. 
Though it may be obvious, I must point out that an explanation which incorrectly 
identifies a contributing cause as a counteracting cause, or a counteracting cause as a 
contributing cause cannot be considered a "better" or "worse" explanation at all.  It is 
simply not an explanation, or it is a false explanation.  This just follows from what it is 
to be an aleatory explanation.  An explanation is true iff it meets the canonical form of 
an explanation, as given above.  Since an explanation that includes counteracting causes 
in the set Φ or contributing causes in the set Ψ is does not fit the canonical form, it is not 
a true explanation at all, no matter how convincing or clear it might be. 
 
 44
Probability Values 
 
 It should be noted that unlike the other models I have covered that allow for 
indeterminism, Humphreys' does not include any statement of the probability values 
involved.  Hempel's I-S model and Railton's D-N-P model each conferred a probability 
value on their explanandum, and Salmon's S-R model consisted of very little but a series 
of probability statements, but here Humphreys has given us a probabilistic model that 
does not make mention of probability values at any point.  Why is this?  There are, in 
fact, two reason for this.  One is simple and relates to some points I have already 
covered.  The other is more complicated and stems from Humphreys views of the nature 
of probabilities and propensities.  I will explain each briefly.   
 The simple problem with including probability values in an explanation is that 
they will almost invariably make that explanation false.  This relates to a problem that 
Salmon's S-R model had.  Basically, the problem is that there is always (or almost 
always) some information that we do not have, or that we are unaware of the 
implications of, which will throw off our probability calculations, thus rendering the 
values in our explanation incorrect.  So, to use our previous example, John's chances of 
contracting malaria given that he has been infected with malaria plasmodium and that he 
is a heterozygote with regard to the sickle hemoglobin gene are .05.  Now, say we put 
together an explanation of his not contracting malaria that cites this value: "John did not 
contract malaria because the probability of a heterozygote with regards to the sickle 
hemoglobin gene who has been infected with malaria plasmodium contracting the 
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disease is .05.35"  Now, imagine that we did not know that John had been taking quinine 
faithfully for months prior to the infection.  This extra true fact about the world lowers 
the probability that John will contract malaria from .05 to, say, .01.  Now, simply 
because we were missing a piece of information about the world, our explanans is false.  
As such, it cannot possible hope to explain John's not contracting malaria36.  Since, as 
we discussed earlier, completeness is not to be expected in science, it would seem that 
there will almost always be some little unknown fact that alters the probability value in 
any explanation somewhat.  To take a more extreme case, imagine that, unbeknownst to 
us, John had drunk one cup more than the average amount of water in the two weeks 
prior to his infection, and that this lowered his chances of getting malaria from .05 to, 
say, .0499999.  Even such a trivial change in the probability values would make an I-S, 
S-R, or D-N-P explanation false.  As a result, explanations that involve probability 
values are not practical in science, and if we happened upon a true one, it would almost 
certainly be by luck. 
 But consider the first of the above cases from the standpoint of an aleatory 
explanation.  We would say (assuming that we still don't know about the quinine) that 
John did not contract malaria because he is a heterozygote with regard to the sickle 
hemoglobin gene, despite the fact that he was infected with malaria plasmodium.  This  
                                                          
35 I realize, of course, that the other models of explanation would not use this linguistic form (which is a 
variation on the canonical form, except that it involves probability values), but the criticisms should work 
no matter how you set it up. 
36 Hempel might disagree.  His I-S model is relativized to a particular epistemic situation.  This means that 
the counterexample does not work against I-S explanations, since the facts about quinine were not in our 
body of knowledge K.  But as we have seen the difficulties Coffa raised with regard to epistemic 
relativization, I hardly think that Hempel's view is to be preferred here. 
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incomplete aleatory explanation is true even though we are missing some information.  It 
would certainly be a better explanation if it included the relevant facts about the quinine, 
but that is not necessary in order to have a partial explanation.  Most importantly, 
because we did not cite any probability values, nothing in the statement is false.  As long 
as we have correctly identified some contributing and counteracting causes, we have 
given an explanation of the explanandum.  So the main reason not to include probability 
values in aleatory explanations is simply that we want at least some of the explaining 
done by scientists to be correct. 
 It might be objected that even Humphreys' account can fall victim to the general 
problem of missing information.  For instance, imagine our case with the car skidding 
off the road.  We might say "it skidded because it was traveling too fast and there was 
sand on the road, despite the fact that the brakes were good."  Now imagine that, 
unbeknownst to us, there was ice on the road.  Well, now the presence of sand turns out 
not to be a contributing cause of the skid, but rather a counteracting cause of it 
(increasing the sliding friction, rather than decreasing it).  So our apparently good 
aleatory explanation turns out to be false because of some information we didn't have.  
While it is true that this danger exists with aleatory explanations just as it does with the 
others, and while this does mean that apparently good aleatory explanations are often 
incorrect, at least with aleatory explanations, there is some chance of being correct 
reasonably often.  The fact is, anything that would make an aleatory explanation false 
would make any of the other accounts (I-S, S-R, D-N-P) false as well, but most of the 
things that make those accounts false would not make an aleatory explanation false.  It 
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seems sensible to stick with the view that at least gives us a chance to produce correct 
explanations, even if it is still difficult and requires careful study and experimentation. 
 The second problem that Humphreys has with including probability values as a 
part of explanations stems from his views about exactly how probabilities relate to 
propensities.  A propensity is loosely defined as an indeterministic disposition that a 
natural system has.  The most obvious example of something that is widely believed to 
involve such a propensity is the decay of a radioactive atom.  Our best science at the 
moment tells us that any given atom of Uranium 238 might decay over a particular time, 
but that it is in principle impossible to tell for sure.  This irreducible chance is often 
called the propensity of the atom to decay.  It seems like there are (or at least might be) 
such propensities in the natural world, and it seems like our theory of probability ought 
to be able to handle them.  After all, we seem to be able to make sense of expressions 
like "That atom has a probability of .01 of decaying this year," and it just seems like 
probability, if it corresponds to anything in the world, must correspond to chances.  But 
unfortunately, the apparatus of the probability calculus has incredible difficulty with this 
matter.  It is usually seen as more fitting mathematically to regard probabilities as long-
term frequencies within a system.  So in the case of our atom, the frequency 
interpretation would say "In the long run, .01 of all atoms of this type will decay within 
any given year."  But this is very different from saying this atom has a particular chance 
of decaying.  To transfer the frequency interpretation onto propensities in this manner 
commits the fallacy of division, assuming that the parts are like the whole.  So there is a 
rather serious problem here that has still yet to be resolved.  I will not pretend to solve it, 
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but I will give Humphreys' view of the matter, which should shed some light on why he 
doesn't want probability values in his aleatory explanations.  
 In "Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities,"37 Humphreys puts forth a rather 
detailed and technical argument that can fortunately be summarized more simply as 
follows.  Probability calculation involves a certain symmetry between the two parts of a 
conditional probability statement.  So if you know the probability that a given draw will 
produce a black marble given that it came from urn A, and you know the probability that 
the draw will be from urn A and the probability that it will produce a black marble, then 
you can deduce the probability that it was drawn from urn A given that it is black.  So 
from the probability value of "B, given A" we can (provided sufficient additional data) 
deduce that value of "A, given B" in every case of a conditional probability.  But 
consider now a propensity translated into the form of a conditional probability.  A simple 
case might be "This piece of metal has a .5 propensity to emit an electron given that it is 
exposed to a particular amount of light."  But even if we knew the probability that it 
would be exposed to the light and the probability that it would emit an electron, it would 
still seem odd to say that we know the propensity it has to be exposed to a particular 
amount of light, given that it emits an electron.  Since the propensity is in some sense 
causal, it carries with it all the asymmetry of causality.  We can say that a window has 
probability 1 of breaking, given that it is hit by a rock, but it seems almost nonsensical to 
ask what its probability of having been hit by a rock is, given that it breaks.  So 
Humphreys develops this rather informal argument in more formal terms, and winds up 
                                                          
37 Paul Humphreys.  "Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities." 
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with the conclusion that probabilities cannot be propensities.  But rather than take the 
standard approach and try to make our scientific models fit the frequency approach that 
is so much more appropriate for probability, Humphreys just says, in effect, "so much 
the worse for the probability calculus if it can't handle propensities."  So Humphreys 
endorses the idea that there are chance phenomena in the world, but denies that the 
probability calculus is the proper way of dealing with them.   
We can see then what his other motivation behind not including probability 
values in his explanatory account is.  He simply doesn't think that probability values 
(properly understood) have any place in our discussion of the propensities embodied by 
the physical world.  Together with the more obvious fact that requiring probability 
values in our explanations will virtually always make them false, we can see that there 
are good reasons to omit the precise probability statements endorsed by other models in 
favor of Humphreys' account. 
 
The Superiority of the Aleatory Model 
 
Now let me review the conditions of the adequacy of a model of scientific 
explanations that I developed in the last chapter.  If you recall, these conditions were 
developed by examining some of the shortcomings of the other prominent theories of 
explanation, and so any explanatory model that satisfies them would be at least 
somewhat more acceptable than these other models (provided, of course, that the model 
in question is internally coherent, accords with our intuitions, and accurately describes 
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the procedures of science).  I will go through each of these conditions one at a time and 
determine whether or not Humphreys' model satisfies them.  
First, the model ought to be rigid enough to clearly distinguish true from false 
explanations, and scientific from non-scientific explanations.  It is clear that aleatory 
explanations, unlike Lewis' theory of causal explanations, gives us necessary and 
sufficient conditions on true explanations, provides us with a somewhat rigid linguistic 
format, and even gives us some notion of what counts as a cause within his theory.  To 
the extent that his theory might be seen as containing any looseness, it is a looseness 
implied by the diversity of, and difficulties with actual scientific explanations.  For 
instance, Humphreys does not give us a full explanation of causation, but theories of 
causation do actually vary within the scientific and philosophical communities.  Further, 
his explanations involve incompleteness, but this too is appropriate, since our scientific 
knowledge is in fact incomplete. 
Second, our model ought to involve causation essentially.  This is a requirement 
satisfied by several of the models we have looked at, so Humphreys' model is not unique 
in this respect, but his account does clearly rest on causation.  The elements of the sets Φ 
and Ψ must be causes.    
Third, the model ought to allow for both deterministic and indeterministic 
explanations.  This requirement is satisfied, since Humphreys allows the causes in 
question to be deterministic or indeterministic.  This might raise some questions about 
whether there could be indeterministic causes, but the question is not at all harmful to 
the theory, since if there are no indeterministic causes, then one ought only to cite 
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deterministic causes in explanations.  This is not a problem, since the model works either 
way. 
Fourth, the model should avoid citing natural laws unless it can give a good non-
circular account of them.  Humphreys satisfies the first part of this disjunction by leaving 
laws out of his model altogether.  In fact, not only are laws not explicitly mentioned in 
the canonical form, it would be unlikely for a law to ever count as a member of Φ or Ψ, 
since laws merely describe regularities, and do not themselves cause anything. 
Fifth, the model should avoid having any sort of requirement of maximal 
specificity (RMS).  As discussed, failure to meet this requirement results in explanations 
that are either false or so overly detailed that they describe regularities of only the single 
event in question, so that most or all explanations are deterministic (and somewhat 
circular).  Well, aleatory explanations are not required to be maximally specific, and, 
indeed, are almost always incomplete in some way.  The requirement that the causes be 
properly sorted as contributing and counteracting is nowhere near as limiting or 
problematic as RMS (as discussed earlier in this chapter). 
Sixth, our explanations should be objectively true (that is, not relativized to any 
epistemic situation) and empirically verifiable (or falsifiable).  Certainly, aleatory 
explanations are objectively true.  Whether or not a particular thing is a cause of another 
is not a matter of a knowledge-situation or a state of information.  Nor is it a matter of 
any person's (or society's) opinions or beliefs.  Presumably, whatever is meant by 
'causes', they are real things "out there" in the world.  Further, if causes are indeed "out 
there," they can probably be discovered and understood (reasonably well) through 
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empirical observation and experimentation.  As such, it would seem that Humphreys' 
account meets both parts of this requirement. 
Finally, it is important that any explanatory account be essentially non-
inferential.  In the next chapter I will discuss the reasons for this in some detail, but for 
the moment, I will simply say that telling me something was likely to happen or could be 
expected to happen (as the D-N and I-S models do with regard to explananda, and as the 
D-N-P model does with regard to the probability of explananda) does not get me any 
closer to an understanding of why it happened.  Humphreys clearly avoids this pitfall, 
eschewing not only inference itself, but also the assignment of probability values that 
would make such an inference possible. 
I conclude, then, that the aleatory model of scientific explanations is superior to 
the other models discussed, as it answers to their problems without creating any undue 
difficulties in the process.  If we further assume that these models are indicative of the 
sorts of models of scientific explanation that exist within the literature, then it would not 
be unreasonable to imagine that Humphreys theory is the best (or at least one of the best) 
models of explanation that there are.  Whether or not this is true, I think that the aleatory 
model does work very well to describe and determine the explanatory practices of 
science, even though there are some minor modifications that must be made with regards 
to the quality of aleatory explanations (which I will propose in my last chapter).   
My next two chapters discuss some of the reasons for and implications of this 
sort of explanatory model.  In particular, I will discuss the motivation behind the non-
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inferential account in the next chapter, and I will discuss the merits and shortcomings of 
contrastive and non-contrastive explanations in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V  
 
EXPLANATION VS. INFERENCE 
 
 
The aleatory model of explanations is essentially non-inferential.  That is, just knowing 
the explanation given of the explanandum, one could not infer (inductively or 
deductively) that the explanandum is in fact the case.  Of course, it is always assumed 
that only truths can be explained, so in a sense, one could infer the truth of the 
explanandum from the existence of the explanation, but what is important here is that one 
could not infer it from the facts contained in the explanation.  So given the canonical 
form "A because Φ, despite Ψ," one could know all the members of Φ and Ψ and still be 
incapable of inferring A.  There are three reasons for this.  First, when it comes to 
indeterminate causation, which is allowed on Humphreys' model, one is never sure that 
the effect will occur along with the cause, and in some cases, it is in fact very unlikely 
that the effect will occur along with the cause.  Remember, even very unlikely events 
can be explained on the aleatory model.  Second, and this applies to deterministic and 
indeterministic causation, explanations are pretty much always incomplete, so there 
could be some contributing causes involved that are not mentioned, and hence the 
inference could be blocked.  Most importantly, however, for the purposes of this chapter, 
aleatory explanations are not inferential in their format.  The explanandum is not 
presented as the conclusion of an argument of any sort.   
 The idea that explanations are a sort of inference, however, is fundamental to 
several other models, and is a commonly held idea within the philosophy of science.  
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Hempel, exemplifying the logical empiricist tradition in this matter, was a staunch 
advocate of this view, as we can see by the format of the D-N and I-S models that he 
presented us with.  In this chapter I will discuss some of the reasons why explanations 
should not be thought of as inferences and why, therefore, Humphreys' model is not only 
an acceptable one (with regard to this matter), but superior to those inferential models 
mentioned earlier.  It will also turn out that some of the reasons we have for thinking that 
explanations should not be inferential can be turned around and used as reasons why 
explanations should be causal (which Humphreys' model quite clearly is), so I will 
dedicate some time to this matter at the end of the chapter. 
 
Jeffrey on Explanation and Inference 
 
 In "Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference,"38 Richard Jeffrey vigorously 
attacks the notion that statistical scientific explanations are arguments.  He does so by 
pointing out a number of ways in which explanations and arguments seem, intuitively, to 
differ from one another.  Before going into Jeffrey's arguments on this matter, it is 
important to point out one way in which his analysis of explanation differs from the 
analyses of many other philosophers.  Where most philosophers (as I have previously 
mentioned) consider an explanation to be an answer to a 'why?' question, Jeffrey speaks 
of two sorts of explanation-seeking questions: 'why?' and 'how?'.  He allows that the 
answer to either question might be considered an explanation, and that a complete 
                                                          
38 Richard Jeffrey.  “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference.”  
 56
explanatory account should answer both questions39.  The 'how?' question is answered in 
terms of whatever process it was that brought about the event in question.  This will be 
some sort of stochastic (i.e. causal) mechanism, and could be either deterministic or 
indeterministic, provided only that it leads to the explanandum.  The answer to the 
'why?' question in statistical, or probabilistic, situations is always 'by chance', or, more 
interestingly, 'there is no damned reason, it was pure chance'.  Although he is not explicit 
about this, I think it may be safely inferred that the answer to the 'why?' question in 
deterministic situations will always be something like 'because the stochastic process 
(from the answer to the 'how?' question) necessitated (determined) it'.40  It is not entirely 
clear to that causal information always (or even usually) answers 'how?' rather than 
'why?' questions, nor is it clear that an adequate explanation must answer to each of 
these questions.  In fact, it seems to me that with regard to scientific explanations in 
particular, the 'how?' is usually included within the 'why?', and that one has simply not 
explained why an event occurred if one has made no reference to a cause or a stochastic 
process.  However, the acceptance of Jeffrey's view of explanation-seeking questions is 
not crucial to one's acceptance of his arguments here.  It is just important to be aware of 
it. 
 The first problem that Jeffrey brings up is hard to give a good name or 
description to.  It arises in cases where an argument renders its conclusion probable, or 
                                                          
39 Already we see a fundamental difference between Humphreys and Jeffrey.  Humphreys sees no reason 
why there should ever be a 'complete' explanation in science, but Jeffrey seems to think it to be a realistic 
and desirable state of affairs. 
40 "In general, where the inference meets certain conditions, one of which is that a causal law appear 
among the premises, deductively grounded prediction will double as explanation.  In these cases, 
knowledge that is imparted in such a way as to provide knowledge why as well."  Ibid. 107 
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even certain, but fails to explain that conclusion because of the ways in which the 
premises relate to one another or to the conclusion itself.  To use Jeffrey's example: 
 
The glass is falling. 
Whenever the glass falls the weather turns bad. 
 ∴ The weather will turn bad.41 
 
The above argument deals with true (or at least true for the sake of argument - obviously 
it doesn't really rain every time the glass falls) empirically verifiable premises, one of 
which is a general law.  The conclusion is validly deduced, and both premises were 
required for the deduction (all of which is important since Jeffrey's main argument is 
against D-N and I-S models of explanation).  However, we do not have an adequate 
explanation of the explanandum.  The falling of the glass does not in any way bring 
about the change in the weather.  The premises would, intuitively, never properly answer 
a 'why?' or 'how?' question about the weather.  Another example is Bromberger's 
flagpole example.42  We know that a certain flagpole is x feet tall, and that it casts a 
shadow that is y feet long.  We also know the position of the sun at the time in question 
and using that fact, in conjunction with the law of rectilinear propagation of light, we can 
deduce the length of the shadow (y) from the height of the flagpole (x).  This would, on 
Hempel's theories at least, count as a valid explanation.  What is odd, though, is that we 
can turn the explanation around and explain the height of the flagpole in terms of its 
shadow (along with the relevant facts about the sun and the nature of light).  This seems 
                                                          
41 Ibid.  106 
42 Wesley Salmon.  Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. 
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counterintuitive.43  How can a shadow tell us why (that is explain why) the 
corresponding has the height it does?   There seems to be a definite gap between 
explanation and inference in both these cases.  Jeffrey is willing to admit, however, that 
arguments of the following form could serve as explanations44: 
 
 The glass is falling. 
 Whenever the glass is falling the atmospheric pressure is falling. 
Whenever the atmospheric pressure is falling the weather turns bad.   
 ∴ The weather will turn bad.45 
 
He thinks this is a fine example of explanation because it really lets us know why the 
event in question occurs.  Here we have an explanation that refers to the stochastic 
process whereby the weather turns bad, and we therefore have a good understanding of 
that event. The first two examples shed light on the idea that inference (deductive or 
otherwise) is not a sufficient condition for explanation, even when all the proper 
Hempelian restrictions are taken into account, but the third leads us to wonder whether is 
might at least be a necessary condition. 
 It is in response to this notion that Jeffrey gets into probabilistic explanations.  
He uses, as an example of a probabilistic (or chance) event, a series of coin tosses.  If we  
                                                          
43 It is interesting to note that Hempel himself had no problem at all with such explanations.  He uses the 
example of an explanation of the period of a pendulum in terms of its length being turned into an 
explanation of its length in terms of its period.  While he admits that the latter explanation seems odd to 
our pre-philosophical and pre-scientific intuitions, he thinks that once we come to terms with the fact that 
you cannot change one without changing the other, the oddness goes away. 
44 Though I would disagree, along with Humphreys, that it is an explanation, since the relevant causal 
information does not fit the canonical form.  I will, however, follow Jeffrey's arguments through without 
worrying too much about the precise format of his explanatory accounts.  He is not proposing an alternate 
model of explanation in this work, but is rather working within that Deductive-Nomological framework in 
order to attack it. 
45 "Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference."  106 
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toss a coin 10 times, with a probability of .5 of heads on each toss (where the tosses are, 
of course, independent of one another46), we can deduce ahead of time what the 
probability of any given combination of results will be.  For instance, the probability of 
getting zero heads after ten trials is 1/1024.  The probability, then, of getting at least one 
head will be 1023/1024.  Jeffrey generalizes the probability calculations for "at least one 
head" in the following manner: 
 
If i1,…, ik are all distinct, then P(Hi1 & … & Hik) = 1/2k 
========================================[1 -2-n] 
H1 v H2 v … v Hn 
 
 
 Where Hi = "toss number i comes up heads' 
 
Now Hempel might regard the above argument form as an explanation of the 
occurrence of one head, provided that n is a large enough number.  For instance, if we 
flipped the coin ten times the argument above would have a strength of 1023/1024, 
which would almost certainly be a sufficiently high probability for Hempel.  If we only 
flipped the coin once, however, the strength of the argument is only 1/2, which is 
insufficient for Hempelian explanation.  But, says Jeffrey, there is a confusion involved 
here between the probability of the explanandum and the strength of the argument.  
Jeffrey sees the above argument as a deductive argument conferring the probability of 1 
- 2-n on its conclusion.  It does not, however, answer any questions about how or why the 
explanandum-event occurred. 
                                                          
46 So ∀xy[ P(Hx | Hy) = P(Hx | ¬Hy) ], or , the probability of heads on any one trial given heads on any 
other trial is the same as the probability of heads on that first trial given not-heads on the second.  That is, 
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Perhaps it is part of the explanation to point out (as in the brackets above) that 
the probability of the explained phenomenon is…1 - (1/2n), but the strength of the 
explanation would be no greater with n = 10 than with n=1!  To say, in the case n=1, that 
the statistical probability is 1/2, is as much of an explanation as one can give.47 
 
Jeffrey's basic argument for why the occurrence of at least one head on a single toss is 
just as explicable as the occurrence of at least one head on ten tosses is simply that in 
either case we understand the statistical and the stochastic processes involved.  
Furthermore, because of the nature of the stochastic process in question, which is a 
chance process, the argument given above does not in any way add to our understanding.  
It is really deductive in a sort of trivial way (where the conclusion is quite clearly 
contained in the premise), so it can hardly be said to answer any 'why?' or 'how?' 
questions for us.  As Jeffrey puts it: 
 
[F]or n=10 it is possible, although highly unlikely, that there will be ten tails, and 
if this happens we shall know all there is to know about the why of it and the how, when 
we know that the process which yielded the ten tails is a random one and when we know 
the probabilistic law governing the process.  The knowledge that the process was 
random answers the question, 'Why?' - the answer is, 'By chance'.  Knowledge of the 
probabilistic law governing the process answers the question 'How' - that answer is, 
'Improbably, as a product of such-and-such stochastic process.  Note that knowledge of 
the probabilistic law of the process makes it at most a matter of calculation to find that 
the statistical probability of the phenomenon  - ten tails - is 1/1024.48 
 
Hence, it would seem that arguments are not only insufficient for explanations (on 
Jeffrey's account), they are also unnecessary.  Once we understand that the event in 
question occurred (as Jeffrey puts it) 'by chance', and 'Improbably, as the result of such-
                                                                                                                                                                           
the outcome of one event doesn't change the probabilities of any of the others.    
47 Ibid. 108 
48 Ibid. 109 
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and-such stochastic process', we really have all the answers we need as far as 
explanation goes.   
Having established that explanations are not arguments, Jeffrey sees the need to 
provide an error thesis to explain why we are so convinced by the idea that explanations 
are essentially inferential.  The answer is simply that it is usually possible, when an 
event occurs, to give an argument that confers at least reasonably high probability on it.  
As for why this is the case, there is a tautological (or apparently tautological) 
explanation: the usual usually occurs.  Whenever an event occurs, more often than not, it 
will be probable; that is just what it means for something to be probable (at least on most 
accounts.  Remember that Humphreys does not think it is appropriate to speak of the 
probability of a chance event).  In Jeffrey's words: 
 
The situation [is not] changed when (as usual) the probable happens.  Because such 
cases are usual, we can usually give a statistical inference of strength 1/2 or more then 
we can give a statistical explanation; and this, I take it, is why it is easy to mistake the 
inference for an explanation.49 
 
 
Although I agree with Jeffrey's conclusion that the view of explanations as arguments is 
in error, I do not think this argument adequately explains the error.   
First of all, it is not at all clear to me that most events that occur are probable or 
"usual."  Such a thesis, I think, assumes a very odd view of events, both probable and 
otherwise.  To demonstrate this, imagine the roll of a single, six-sided die.  I take it that 
the roll of a die is a very good and ordinary example of a chance event50, and that the 
                                                          
49 Ibid. 109 
50 It is certainly used often enough in introductory texts on probability. 
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most natural way of stating the possible outcomes is the set {1,2,3,4,5,6}.  The result of 
the roll will be one of these six outcomes, with an equal chance of each.  But of course, 
that means none of the possible outcomes are at all probable.  The only way to get a 
probable event out of the roll is to subsume certain outcomes under broader definitions 
in a rather counterintuitive way, like {1, not-1}.  In this case, not-1 is far more probable 
than 1, but we have lost a certain amount of depth in our analysis of the probabilities.  
To be sure, there are cases where {1, not-1} are the only results that matter to me (like if 
my life, for some reason, depended on a particular die coming up 1), but we cannot 
always be satisfied by such options.  There are, of course, many other ways of setting up 
the probabilities ({less than 3.5, greater than 3.5}, {odd, even}, {factor of 6, not a factor 
of 6}, {1,2,3,4, greater than 4}, and so on) some of which will render the actual result 
probable, others will render it improbable. 
If even a reasonable number of the probabilistic events in the world have more 
than two logically distinct ways of describing their possible outcomes51, then whether or 
not the majority of chance events are probable would seem to be a matter of context and 
interest.  It is not up to the logician or the statistician to determine ahead of time what 
outcomes are most important, and so it is not possible to say a priori what events are 
                                                          
51 What sort of case qualifies for this exception?  Well, take the case of a coin weighted such that P(H) = .6 
and P(T) = .4.  There are only two logically distinct ways of describing the outcomes of this trial that are 
consistent and that exhaust all the possibilities: {H,T} and {H v T}.  {H v T} is, of course a non-
probabilistic description of the outcome, but it does accurately describe the outcome of the trial.  I will 
accept that any situation in which there are only two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive outcomes 
with different probabilities (like the aforementioned weighted coin) is a situation in which there is a 
probable or "usual" event, but I do not think that such cases are numerous enough to imply that most 
events are probable. 
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most probable or "usual," or indeed, whether or not there are any probable events52.  
Jeffrey may still have a good point here, if it is indeed the case that we ordinarily 
subsume events like the outcome of a die, the flipping of the penny, or the fluctuations 
of the market under broader (i.e. more probable) rather than narrower (i.e. less probable) 
descriptions, but he would be leaving open the question of why we behave in this way53, 
which is, I think, an important part of any error thesis.   
 My second point of contention with Jeffrey deals with the logical structure of his 
argument.  He has said that most events are usual, and that when an event is usual we 
can usually give an argument for it.  Even if we were to grant these premises, the 
conclusion that we can give an argument for most events does not follow from them.  
Imagine that "most events are usual" is true because the usual occurs 60% of the time 
(that is, with .6 likelihood54, a given event that occurs will be usual).  This would satisfy 
Jeffrey's requirement that the probability be 1/2 or more.  Further, imagine that "we can 
usually give a statistical inference of usual events" is true because we can give a 
statistical inference of usual events 60% of the time (that is, the probability we can give 
an inference of a usual event is .6).  From these two premises the conclusion that follows 
is that we can give inferences for only 36% of all events.   
 
  
 
                                                          
52 Except, of course, to the extent that he or she could show there to be cases like that of the weighted 
penny, but this would require research beyond what the logician does qua logician. 
53 Which, I take it, must be answered psychologically.  That is, it must be answered by a psychological 
explanation. 
54 This is, I admit, a very odd way of speaking, since I am using the word "most" (i.e. >50%) along with a 
statistical value of .6 (which, of course, is >50%).  This may seem to be trivially true, but I do not think 
that it is.  See my argument in the preceding paragraphs. 
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P(Ux) = .6 
 P(Ix | Ux) = .6 
 P(Ux & Ix) = .36 
 
 x is an arbitrary event 
 Ux = 'x is usual' 
 Ix = 'x can be inferred' 
 
So it is clear that the argument, as it is set up, is inadequate to explain the error that is 
committed by those who think that inference is a necessary component of explanation. 
How then can we solve the problem?  Certainly if one were willing to admit that the vast 
majority of events are "usual," or that a vast majority of "usual" events are inferable, 
Jeffrey's argument would be valid.  But for reasons that I have explained above, I find 
such an approach highly questionable, and, at any rate, very likely to be unsuccessful.   
I think the more reasonable approach is to ask ourselves whether we do 
ordinarily believe that explanation requires argumentation.  I think that a moment's 
reflection on either our first experience with the D-N or I-S models or on the 
commonplace acts of explanation that we both witness and perform on a daily basis will 
reveal just how little the notions of argumentation and inference have affected our notion 
of explanation.  We consider environment, diet and genetics to be good explanations of 
certain cancers, despite the fact that these factors do not confer a high probability on the 
cancer itself.  Even smoking, the American Lung Association's number one "no-no," 
raises the probability of getting lung cancer by considerably less than 50%, which means 
that one could never provide a convincing argument that smoking will be followed by 
lung cancer, and yet we regularly explain lung cancer in terms of smoking habits.  These 
preceding examples show our lack of interest in inference and predictability in some 
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commonly understood scientific explanations, which is, of course, important to my 
thesis.  But for the purposes of analyzing our most naive intuitions, let us take a far more 
banal example.  Suppose I walk up to a bank of three elevators, and press the button.  
The elevator in the middle soon opens up and I get inside.  A perfectly good explanation 
of why the middle elevator opened is that I pressed the button.  This is despite the fact 
that there was only a one in three chance of that particular elevator opening. 
On the other side of things, we very rarely consider arguments for an event to be 
at all adequate in explaining the event.  If I ask, "why does the television come on when 
I press the button on the remote?" and get the response, "These are a late-model 
television and remote.  The television is plugged in and the remote has fresh batteries.  
In such circumstances, the probability that the remote will activate the television is 
greater than 99%.  That means that the event in question was very likely, and so it 
occurred." I would respond with, "yes, that's all well and good, but I want to know why 
the television turns on when I press the button on the remote?"55  Such arguments are 
often completely unconvincing as explanations, despite the high (sometimes even 
deductive) likelihood that they confer on their conclusions. 
The purpose of going through our intuitions about all these cases (Jeffrey's, and 
my own) is to show that we really don't find Hempelian argument-style explanations all 
that convincing in the first place.  No matter how committed a Hempelian one is, it is 
likely that in ordinary practice non-argumentative explanations like the ones above seem 
                                                          
55 Jeffrey, of course, would say I'm looking for the answer to the 'how?' question here, but whether it's 
'why?' or 'how?', the argument clearly doesn't provide an answer. 
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pretty good (and conversely, some of the argumentative ones seem pretty bad).56  It is 
odd that Jeffrey thinks we are as attached to inference as he does, since most of his 
article is designed to reveal our intuitions on the subject, and they all come out negative.  
So, to restate: the error is not our conviction that good explanations must be inferences, 
it is the belief that we ever had such a conviction in the first place.   
 
Salmon on Explanation and Inference 
 
 Wesley Salmon, in Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, building on Jeffrey's 
work, provides us with two more reasons to think that explanations are not arguments.  
First, there is a problem with irrelevancies in explanation that does not come up in 
argumentation.  If I try to explain Jones's failure to become pregnant by saying that he is 
a male who faithfully consumes birth control pills, my explanation is a bad one.  His 
consumption of birth control pills is, of course, totally irrelevant to his not becoming 
pregnant, and this hurts the explanation.  If I just say "Jones is male," I have a good  
explanation, but when I add the birth control pill irrelevancy, I get a bad explanation.  To  
consider a less frivolous case, imagine that a drug is administered to a person suffering 
from a common cold.  After a few days their cold symptoms clear up completely.  It 
would be very unwise (and, in fact scientifically irresponsible) of us to explain the 
recovery by mentioning the drug.  After all, most common colds clear up after a few 
days with or without treatment, so without any (extensive) research into the relative 
                                                          
56 One might argue that they only seem good when we are not thinking philosophically, and that our 
everyday discourse can be separated from our philosophical views.  To quote David Lewis, "An analysis 
that imputes widespread error is prima facie implausible.  Moreover, it is dishonest to accept it, if you 
yourself persist in the "error" when you leave the philosophy room."  (David Lewis.  "Causation,” 175) 
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recovery speeds of those administered the drug versus a control group, it would be 
unwise to consider the drug relevant, and mention of the drug therefore lacks 
explanatory force.  But this is very different from any sort of valid deductive inference57, 
where irrelevancies are harmless.  Consider the following: 
 
Either Jones is not pregnant or Mary is not pregnant 
Mary is pregnant  
Jones has faithfully consumed birth control 
Jones is not pregnant 
 
All people with common colds feel better after a few days 
Jones had a common cold a few days ago 
Jones has taken the new miracle drug 
Jones feels better 
 
These are both perfectly valid sequents.  Neither one, however, could work as an 
explanation because they contain irrelevancies in the third premise.  The argument 
Salmon gives here is intended to build on the points Jeffrey made in the barometer 
example.  Not only can an argument not explain when the premises relate in improper  
ways to the conclusion (as Jeffrey notes), but they can also fail as explanations when 
there exists a premise that does not relate at all to the conclusion (That is, the conclusion 
is deducible without the premise).  Hempel is, of course aware of this problem, hence the 
restrictions he puts on D-N explanation.  Even with that restriction in place, however, 
Salmon's point still holds that there is a definite asymmetry between explanations and 
arguments. 
                                                          
57 This applies even to relevance logic in some respects.  While P ∴ ¬(Q & ¬Q) is not a valid sequent in 
relevance logic, P & Q ∴ ¬(Q & ¬Q) is, despite the irrelevancy of the P in the premise.  An explanation 
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 The other problem Salmon presents us with is that of the differing temporal 
restrictions of explanations and arguments.  An argument for the occurrence of event e 
could, it would seem, contain vital premises regarding the nature of things after e has 
occurred.  For instance, the occurrence of a solar eclipse can be inferred from the 
positions of the earth, sun, and moon prior to the eclipse, along with the relevant laws of 
planetary motion.  An inference of this sort would, at least on some accounts, count as an 
explanation of the eclipse.  However, the occurrence of an eclipse could be just as easily 
inferred from the positions of the sun, earth, and moon after the eclipse.  We would not 
want to say, however, that the latter inference could count as an explanation.  This may 
be a somewhat controversial point, but it seems to have a great deal of intuitive appeal, if 
only from the ways we ordinarily use language, and the way we regard explanations as 
answers to "why?" questions.  There are many different diseases that we say can explain 
a person's death, but there is never a case in which we say that a person's death (no 
matter how distinctive it is) explains their having had a particular disease (or having had 
a disease in general), even if we can infer their having had the disease from the fact of 
their death.  Sherlock Holmes may infer that a particular person committed a murder 
from the way they behave after the fact, and we might say that their having committed 
the murder explains their behavior, but neither Holmes nor we would ever say that their 
behavior after the fact explains their having committed the murder.  After all, the 
statement "because he acted in a certain way afterwards" does not answer "why did the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
would seem to fail if even a single conjunct of a premise were irrelevant.  Consider: Jones is male & Jones 
takes birth control. 
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murder occur?,"58 and "because he died" could never explain "why did he get sick?"  So 
an explanation, unlike an argumentative inference, must make some appeal to things that 
occur prior to, or at least at the same time as59 the explanandum. 
 It is interesting to point out here that David Lewis (whose view of causal 
explanation I have mentioned) does not think that explanations can never cite events that 
occur after the explanandum.  His reason for this is that he believes time travel to be at 
least logically possible, and that causation therefore has the potential to go "backward."  
This exception is not a devastating one with regard to Salmon's experiment, since the 
examples involved (the eclipse, for instance) do not in fact involve time travel.  It is, 
however, a very interesting thing to keep in mind, if only because of the relativistic 
concept of time that modern physics presents us with60 — one would not want to make 
any undue assumptions about the physical nature of the universe a part of one's account 
of scientific explanation.   
So where do our intuitive beliefs about explanations lie?  Well, Jeffrey and 
Salmon will both claim that what is really important to any explanation is that it gives us 
some understanding of the causes (or the stochastic process) involved in bringing about 
the explanandum.  Both writers find this to be a rather intuitively appealing way of 
understanding explanation and don't provide much in the way of explicit argument for it 
                                                          
58 Or perhaps "why did he commit the murder?" 
59 Whether the explanans and the explanandum can occur simultaneously is not entirely clear to me, but as 
long as it is understood that the explanans cannot come after the explanandum, we have the necessary 
asymmetry between explanations and arguments.   
60 General relativity tells us that neither time nor space is an absolute, but that they are both relative to 
speed.  In other words the space and time in which an event occurs depends strictly on its relative speed 
(relative, that is, to the speed of light in a vacuum).  It is not the purpose of this thesis to sort out the 
philosophical implications of the theory of relativity (good thing, too, because otherwise I would be failing 
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(with the exception, perhaps, of Jeffrey in the coin-tossing case), but I think it would be 
appropriate to examine how the asymmetries that they noticed between explanation and 
inference can be used as the premises for an argument with causal explanation as its 
conclusion.  The argument will, of course, be an abductive61 one, so there may well be 
arguments of similar strength that have opposite conclusions, but I will be happy if I can 
at least show how the notion of causal explanations can tie together our intuitions 
regarding the examples above. 
 First, we have Jeffrey's claim that an explanation of why something happens must 
tell us something about how it happens.  The barometer, taken in isolation, simply cannot 
tell us why it rains.  When we add information about the meteorological situation just 
prior to rain, however, we can really understand the situation.  Atmospheric pressure is 
connected to rain in a way that barometers just aren't.  It is not easy to say exactly why, 
but perhaps it is just the fact that the clouds are way up in the sky and the barometer is 
down on the ground.  It would certainly be difficult to explain the problem in purely 
formal terms.  Salmon's point about the damaging effect of irrelevancies on explanations 
brings up a similar issue, and, like in Jeffrey's example, it is hard to say what exactly is 
so different about the arguments with irrelevant premises and those with only relevant 
premises.62  If we imagine that causation is the crucial aspect of explanation, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
miserably), but this does cast some doubt on the correctness of our naïve intuitions about the temporal 
direction of explanation. 
61 Abduction is, very simply stated, the logic of discovery, or of hypothetical inference.  So the premises 
will not make the conclusion certain, likely, or even possible, but rather the conclusion, if true, would 
render the premises understandable..     
62 Interestingly, Hempel has no problem explaining this case away.  He would simply say that the 
irrelevant premises are not required in the deduction of the conclusion.  Salmon and Jeffrey do not have 
this line of reasoning open, however, since they do not believe explanations are arguments.   
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we can easily make sense of both these examples.  Why does a barometer not explain the 
weather?  Because it doesn't cause the weather.  Why does atmospheric pressure explain 
the weather?  Because it causes the weather.  Similarly for Salmon, the irrelevancy 
problem would be solved if one were to claim that all and only causes properly explain.  
Since a cause cannot fail to be relevant to its effect, we can now argue for why the 
irrelevancies are harmful.  Since the consumption of birth control pills has no causal 
effect on a man's ability to become pregnant, it should not be included in the 
explanation. 
 Jeffrey's next point deals with low-probability explanation.  We can explain even 
those events that are statistically very unlikely, provided that we understand the process 
through with they occurred.  Here Jeffrey himself is quite explicit, when he says that the 
ten-tails result occurs "Improbably, as the result of such-and-such stochastic process."  
Jeffrey tells us that what is missing from the purely statistical inference is the causal part 
of the explanation.  This hypothesis (that causes are crucial to explanation) does seem to 
explain how it is that we understand even the highly improbable.  When we get ten 
heads in a row, we are surprised, but we are not confused. 
 Finally, we have Salmon's temporal priority requirement on explanations.  The 
position of the sun, moon and earth before and eclipse can explain the occurrence of the 
eclipse, and those same positions after the eclipse cannot, despite the fact that the eclipse 
can be deduced from either situation.  Here again, the causal hypothesis offers us a clear 
reason for our intuitions here.  Earlier events can cause later events, but later events 
cannot cause earlier events (this is not, of course, uncontroversial.  Refer to my earlier 
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comments about David Lewis's view of causation), so the latter argument lacks the 
explanatory force of the former. 
 The examples that I have examined here suggest that an explanation must 1) be 
temporally prior to the explanandum, 2) be entirely relevant to the explanandum (that is, 
it must contain no irrelevancies), 3) tell us something about the process through which 
the explanandum occurred (that is, it must answer a "how?" question), and 4) it must 
give us an understanding of the explanandum.  It seems quite clear to me that these four 
conditions lead us to the conclusion that causation is a crucial part (if not the crucial 
part) of any explanation.   
Humphrey's account then, has the advantage of being both essentially non-
inferential and essentially causal.  This allows it to avoid many of the pitfalls suffered by 
models such as Hempel's and it follows more closely our intuitions on the matter of 
explanation.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION AND THE 
SYMMETRY THESIS 
 
In this chapter I will be discussing two issues as they relate to Humphreys' model of 
aleatory explanations.  First, I will explain why contrastive explanations are not 
necessary in scientific discourse.  I will do this primarily through a discussion of Bas van 
Fraassen's model of explanation.  This model was not mentioned earlier, primarily 
because it is not a model of scientific explanations in the sense described in the 
introduction, but rather of explanations in general63, but also because the detailed 
examination that I will be giving it in this chapter, and my desire not to repeat myself.  
The second issue is that of Hempel's "symmetry thesis."  This is the idea that 
explanations must be capable of serving as predictions and vice versa.  As aleatory 
explanations will rarely meet this criterion, I must show why it is not as essential as 
Hempel thought (or perhaps why it is not essential at all).  These two requirements (that 
they be contrastive and that they adhere to the symmetry thesis) on explanatory models 
are distinct, but I believe they have similar motivations.  I will discuss these motivations  
briefly at the end of the chapter and explain why they are inappropriate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 Because of this, when discussing Bas van Fraassen's theory of explanation, I will not restrict myself to 
scientific discourse, as he does not.  It should be noted, however, that his model is intended to cover 
scientific explanations, as well as other types. 
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Contrastive vs. Non-Contrastive Explanation 
 
 
The appropriate answers to a given question in English are in part determined by 
the way one asks the question and by its context of utterance.  Even within the relatively 
rigid language of scientific discourse, two or more 'why?' questions that are syntactically 
identical (i.e. they have the same words and punctuation in the same order) can 
nevertheless be asking for very different information.  Consider the three sentences: 
 
a. Why did Ms. R. kill Mr. R.? 
b. Why did Ms. R. kill Mr. R.? 
c. Why did Ms. R. kill Mr. R.? 
 
 
Each of these questions are syntactically the same, but the emphasis put on the parts of 
each makes it clear that the same answer will not satisfy all three questions.  An 
acceptable answer to (a) might be "because when we decided that Mr. R. had to be 
killed, straws were drawn and she drew the short straw," but this clearly does not 
provide us with an answer to either of the other two questions.  Similarly, "because she 
could make more money off the death of Mr. R. than she could off of the death of Mr. 
S." would be a fine answer to (c), but fails as a response to the other two.  For a more 
scientific example, consider the case raised by Humphreys of the room that is both air-
conditioned and heated.  When we ask, "why did the temperature rise by 5˚C?" we might 
be wondering why it rose at all or why it rose by exactly 5˚C.   
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Bas van Fraassen has developed an entire explanatory system for handling 'why?' 
questions that are syntactically identical, but that have different "acceptable" answers.64  
He starts with the notion that any explanatory question has an appropriate "contrast 
class" of statements that are of the same logical form as the statement to be explained.  
Which statements are to be included as members of the contrast class is a matter to be 
determined by how the question was asked, or what sort of information it is seeking.  For 
instance, a contrast class for (a) might be {'Ms. R killed Mr. R.', 'Ms. S killed Mr. R.', 
'Mr. S killed Mr. R.', 'Mr. R. killed himself.'}, and the contrast class for (b) might be 
{'Ms. R killed Mr. R', 'Ms. R hugged Mr. R', 'Ms. R yelled at Mr. R', 'Ms. R bought ice 
cream for Mr. R'}.   
According to van Fraassen, all but one of the members of a given contrast class 
will be false, and an acceptable explanation will pick out the true one (or the "topic") 
according to a certain "relevance relation."  The notion of a relevance relation is not 
simple to spell out, but it is basically the manner in which an explanation picks out the 
topic from the rest of the contrast class.  The answer to any "why?" question must give a 
reason why the topic is true (rather than the other members of the contrast class), and the 
relevance relation puts a restriction on what sorts of reasons will count.  To give it such 
a definition might make the first sentence of this paragraph seem trivially true (which it 
might be), but consideration of some examples might help us get a grasp on what we are 
talking about.  In all three of the cases above we are most likely seeking some sort of  
                                                          
64 Bas van Fraassen.  The Scientific Image. 
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motive of Ms. R's, so our explanation will provide us with a motive.  In the case of 
John's failure to contract malaria (from the chapter on explanatory models), we are likely 
seeking some physiological facts about John, so our explanation will provide us with 
some physiological facts.  So the relevance relation tells us something about what the 
explanation will look like.  Van Fraassen's total account is set up as follow65s: 
 
[T]he why-question Q expressed by an interrogative in a given context will be 
determined by three factors: 
 
The topic Pk 
The contrast class X = {P1, …, Pk, …} 
The relevance relation R 
 
and, in a preliminary way, we may identify the abstract why-question with the ordered 
triple consisting of these three: 
 
 Q = <Pk, X, R> 
 
A proposition A is called relevant to Q exactly if A bears relation R to the couple <Pk, 
X>. 
 We must now define what are the direct answers to this question.  As a beginning 
let us inspect the form of words that will express such an answer 
 
(*) Pk in contrast to (the rest of) X because A 
 
What is claimed in answer (*)?  First of all, that Pk is true.  Secondly, (*) claims that the 
other members of the contrast-class are not true…Thirdly, (*) says that A is true.  And 
finally, there is that word 'because': (*) claims that A is a reason.66 
 
 
 Perhaps I owe it to the reader to spell out in more detail exactly what all of this 
means, but in the interest of time, I will not be doing this.  The important thing about van  
                                                          
65 I quote Van Fraassen at length here since his account is sufficiently brief and self-explanatory, and I do 
not think I could do much better. 
66 Ibid.  9 
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Fraassen's account, for the purposes of the present discussion, is that it is essentially 
contrastive in nature.  A contrastive explanation is given in response to a question of the 
form "why the explanandum rather than this or that other thing?"  Such a question is an 
example of a "why?" question, but it is clearly very specialized.  It seeks far more 
information that an ordinary "why?" question and is, as a result, far more difficult to 
answer.  Van Fraassen's account is essentially contrastive because this contrast is built 
into the very format of his explanatory model.  He takes it as a very basic fact that 
explanation involves contrasting the actual fact with the relevant alternatives. 
 Contrastive "why?" questions present a major problem for any theory of 
explanation (like Humphreys') that allows for chancy (i.e. non-deductive) explanations, 
particularly those theories that allow for the improbable (or probable but not very 
probable) to be explained or make explicit reference to probabilistic causation.  When 
low-probability events are in question, there can be no answer that explains 
"why…rather than…", since the other things in question (the other members of the 
contrast class) are jointly more likely to occur than the explanandum.  If there were any 
such reason (why the low probability explanandum occurred, rather than the other 
alternatives), then the probabilities would have been misassigned from the start, and the 
explanandum was more likely that we thought.  Further, Under a theory of probabilistic 
(chancy) causation, such as one might see applied to Humphreys' model, it doesn't make 
sense to ask why one event occurred rather than another if they could both have come 
about via the same causal chain.  If A and B are two mutually exclusive possible effects 
of the same causal chain, and A occurs rather than B, then there is no reason why A 
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occurred rather than B.  Since the explanation cites only the causes, and there is no 
difference between the causes of A and the causes of B, their explanatory account would 
be the same whichever happened.  If the probability of A is high, we might say it was to 
be expected, but even this is not a reason that it happened.  To quote Jeffrey, "there's no 
damned reason – it was pure chance"67 
 Yet we obviously do ask contrastive "why?" questions.  Does a causal theory of 
explanation that allows for the explanation of improbable events, such as Humphreys', 
make all such questions unanswerable?  The answer to this question depends 
fundamentally on the nature of the universe, and cannot be determined a priori.   
 Let us look at Humphrey's aleatory model to see if it could be used to answer 
contrastive "why?" questions.  The form of an explanation is "A because Φ, despite Ψ" 
where Φ is a non-empty set of contributing causes, Ψ is a set (possibly empty) of 
counteracting causes, and A is a sentence describing what is to be explained.68  We 
define the notion of a contributing cause as (roughly) "something that makes the 
explanandum more likely" and a counteracting cause as (roughly) "something that makes 
the explanandum less likely."   
 Say I drop a raw egg off the roof of my apartment onto the concrete below, and it 
breaks.  Further, let us say that such an event is completely deterministic, and that there 
was no probability of the egg's not breaking given its having been dropped.  We could 
set up an aleatory explanation of this event as follows: "the egg broke because it was left  
                                                          
67 "Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference."  110. 
68 Paul Humphreys.  " Aleatory Explanations," 227. 
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unsupported at a height of x feet, the Earth has a gravitational pull of y, and the shell of 
the egg has a disposition to crack whenever z amount of pressure is applied to it"  This 
would be a true explanation.  Since we are imagining that this event is completely 
deterministic, these causes must jointly confer a probability (likelihood) of 1 on the egg's 
breaking.  I have not included any counteracting causes (wind resistance, gravitational 
pull of the moon, etc.) though a more complete account might (and could still be 
deterministic, as discussed above), but remember that the set Ψ can be the empty set.  
 I take it that in a case such as the one described, we have an adequate answer to 
any contrastive "why?" question regarding the explanandum.  Questions like, "Why did 
the egg break rather than bounce off the concrete, break through the concrete, or sprout 
wings and fly away?" or, more simply "Why did the egg break rather than not break?"  
Since the contributing causes cited confer upon the explanandum a probability of one, 
we may safely infer that they also confer upon any event mutually exclusive with the 
explanandum a probability of zero.  Hence, our aleatory explanation enables us to say, 
via two separate explanations, "The egg broke because of the causes mentioned (gravity, 
fragility, height, etc.), and it didn't fly away because of those same causes."  So, it would 
appear, we have built up a contrastive explanation of the egg's breaking out of aleatory 
explanations.  The egg broke rather than fly away because of the causes mentioned. 
 Of course, this is all well and good, but it assumes determinism, which would be 
a very odd thing for this model to assume indeed.  While it is true that in our example 
determinism is assumed, it would be a grave mistake to think that the model assumes 
determinism.  The model of aleatory explanation is neutral on the matter of determinism, 
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so if there are deterministic events, it can explain them, and if there are indeterministic 
event, it can explain those too.  The reason I used a deterministic case is that 
indeterministic events, as I explained above, cannot be given contrastive explanations.  
This is not just true of the aleatory model, but of van Fraassen's model as well.  When all 
of the members of a contrast class are possible outcomes of a purely indeterministic 
cause, then there is in principle no reason why one occurs rather than the others.  If we 
say that such a reason must be given in order to properly explain, then indeterministic 
events are all completely inexplicable, regardless of their probabilities.  Now we can see 
why the answer I gave to "does Humphreys' causal theory of explanations make 
contrastive explanations impossible" was that it "depends on the nature of the universe."  
If there are indeed deterministic events, then Humphreys can offer contrastive 
explanations of them.  If there are not any such deterministic events, then he cannot give 
contrastive explanations, but, I contend, neither could any other model, so Humphreys' is 
far from alone here. 
 But do we have good reason to imagine that it is important to be able to give 
contrastive explanations in science?  There does seem to be a way of looking at many 
ordinary and scientific "why?" questions that makes many of them contrastive.  We 
sometimes think that the question "why did the car skid off the road?" has an implied 
"rather than" clause of "rather than go straight."  Certainly, if one takes explanation to be 
deductive (in D-N sense), this claim will have a certain appeal because of the frequent 
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use of the reductio ad absurdum rule in deduction69.  This rule assumes the opposite of 
the conclusion and derives a contradiction from it, thus proving the conclusion; which 
makes the opposite of the conclusion quite relevant to explanation.  Also, in non-
scientific teleological "why?" questions, the contrast class is usually very important.  
"Why did you pick that shirt to wear?," "why did you go straight rather than taking the 
exit ramp?," and "why are you drinking American beer?" are all seeking contrastive 
explanations.  Some might imagine, as van Fraassen seems to, that this implied "rather 
than" clause is thus present in all of our "why?" questions, even when we are not aware 
of it.   
 But does the fact that we sometimes mean "why…rather than…" when we say 
"why?" imply that we always mean "why…rather than…?" when we ask "why?," or that 
we always should?  It most certainly does not.  The simple reason for denying it is that 
we sometimes ask "why?" and we sometimes ask "why…rather than…"  Why would we 
have two different formulations of "why?" questions if they both meant the same thing?  
It is sometimes the case that the English language plays tricks on us, but we would need 
far more evidence than we have to think that that is the case with "why?" questions.  I 
think it is entirely appropriate for a model of scientific explanation to be capable of 
handling both contrastive and non-contrastive explanations and "why?" questions.  We  
should leave the determination of what sort of question is being asked to the scientists 
(or those asking questions of the scientists). 
 
                                                          
69 In the previous chapter I argued that this is not an intuitive way of thinking about explanations, but, 
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The Symmetry Thesis 
 
Carl Hempel, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation70, presents the idea that an 
explanation and a prediction are essentially the same sort of thing, and that the only 
difference is a pragmatic one71.  So, if sentences P and Q provide us with an explanation 
of R, then, if we had been aware of P and Q prior to the occurrence of R, we would have 
been able to predict R.  Similarly, if we had predicted R on the basis of P and Q, then, 
should R in fact occur, we would have an adequate explanation of it (namely P and Q).  
This notion, because it posits a "symmetry" between explanation and prediction is often 
called "the symmetry thesis," and has become a popular criterion on the adequacy of 
explanations and predictions.  Clearly, if it were an appropriate criterion, Humphreys' 
view of aleatory explanations would fail because of it.  After all, with the allowance of 
incompleteness, not even a purely deterministic event could be predicted simply by its 
aleatory explanation, and in the indeterministic case, it would be even more difficult.  I 
will examine here some of the common counterexamples in the literature to both parts of 
the symmetry thesis, and will add a few of my own.  The conclusion will be that there is 
no good reason to accept the symmetry thesis, despite Hempel's claims to the contrary. 
One of the main reasons that the symmetry thesis has enjoyed the popularity that 
it has is that many (including Hempel) believe it can properly distinguish between  
                                                                                                                                                                           
nevertheless, there are those who hold this view, and they may, for that reason, believe in contrastive 
explanations. 
70 Later in his life, Hempel dropped the second half of the symmetry thesis (that predictions are essentially 
explanatory) because of some of the examples I will be presenting here.  Hempel never, however, gave up 
on the idea that explanations are essentially predictive, and this is the aspect of the symmetry thesis that is 
most important to this thesis. 
71 Carl Hempel.  "Aspects of Scientific Explanation." 
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science and pseudoscience.  So an astrologer might correctly predict that a given person 
will "find true love" during a given time period.  The symmetry thesis tells us that this is 
not a scientific prediction because it has no explanatory force.  When asked why her 
prediction came true, the astrologer might respond that "Mercury was rising into 
Capricorn" or some such nonsense, but she will not be able to give an adequate 
explanation of the true-love-finding event according to any of the models explained 
above, and this lack of explanatory power is sufficient (according to the symmetry 
thesis) to make her prediction non-scientific. 
 The converse of the symmetry thesis can be used against such apparently well 
thought out explanations as those found in psychology.  I don't wish to imply that 
psychology and astrology are on the same footing, but the excessively teleological nature 
of most psychological discourse precludes it from counting as a science within the 
language of this paper72.  Peter Achinstein uses Freudian psychology as an example of 
just the sort of thing the symmetry thesis was meant to exclude.  I give his example here 
because of the light I feel it sheds on the nature and purpose of the symmetry thesis: 
 
Freud explained slips of the tongue as the outcome of a compromise between an 
unconscious wish for something and a conscious wish that precludes it.  He tells the 
story of the president of the German parliament who opened the meeting by saying "the 
meeting is now closed."  This slip of the tongue, Freud explained, was the result of a 
conscious wish to open the meeting and an unconscious wish to avoid the meeting 
altogether.  By using the expression "The meeting is now…" the president expressed 
some element of the conscious wish to open the meeting.  But by replacing the word 
"open" with the word "closed," the slip contains a crucial element of the unconscious 
wish. 
Is this an adequate scientific explanation of why the president said what he did?  
Carl G. Hempel…claims it is not…Suppose before the slip of the tongue one had known 
                                                          
72 See my introduction for the restrictions on what I am regarding as 'science' and 'scientific explanation'. 
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that the president had a conscious wish open the meeting and an unconscious wish to 
avoid it.  Using Freud's theory could one have predicted that the president would say 
"The meeting is now closed"?  No, because Freud's theory concerning slips of the tongue 
does not say that a slip of the tongue always or even usually occurs when one has 
conflicting wishes…Nor does the theory provide enough detail to infer what type of slips 
can occur…He suggests some explanatory ideas, but there needs to be a much more fully 
developed theory before Freud can adequately explain particular slips of the tongue.73 
 
 
This is a case in which we can exclude a pseudo-scientific explanation on the basis of its 
non-predictive power.  The intuitive motivation for this is captured in the question "how 
can a theory properly claim to understand an event if it can only ever do so after the 
fact?"  It seems parallel to the man who says he knows everything and challenges 
anyone to find a true sentence he doesn't know.  When presented with any example he 
merely responds, "Oh, yeah.  I knew that."   
However, despite the appeal of the symmetry thesis, I hold that neither side of it 
is in fact correct, and that there could be non-explanatory predictions and non-predictive 
explanations.  I will first give some counterexamples to the idea that predictions are 
essentially explanatory and then devote a bit more time to some counterexamples and 
other replies to the idea that explanations are essentially predictive.  This latter part of 
the symmetry thesis would, if true, be fatal to Humphreys’ account of explanation, so it 
imperative that I determine whether or not it is true. 
 
Prediction as Essentially Explanatory: 
 
 
 For many centuries before the birth of Newton, mariners and astronomers were  
                                                          
73 Peter Achinstein.  "The Symmetry Thesis." 
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aware of a correlation between the position of the moon and the tides.  As we now know, 
thanks (at least in part) to Sir Isaac, there is a direct casual connection involved here--the 
gravity of the moon "pulling" the water towards it.  The mariners, however, did not 
understand the nature of gravitation or the nature of the moon, and, although they might 
have had a thousand myths and superstitions to draw on, they could never have given a 
correct (or even close to correct) scientific explanation of the tides.  Their inability to 
explain the phenomenon, however, did not affect their ability to predict it.  Many ancient 
mariners74 and scientists kept careful track of the moon's position in relation to the tides, 
and made very rational and accurate predictions of the tides based on their data.  This 
type of prediction, which is based on a strong induction and is empirically verifiable (or 
falsifiable), should surely not be grouped with the predictions of the psychic or the 
astrologer75.  It seems like a scientific prediction, and indeed, I think it is. 
 Jeffrey's barometer example is another important one in the literature on both 
explanation and epistemology.  In it, we see a falling barometer, and, because we know 
that this often (or, for the sake of argument we could say always/almost always) 
precedes precipitation, we know that it will rain soon.  We correctly predict the rain, and 
if anyone were to ask for our evidence, we would simply point to the barometer reading.   
The difference between this case and the moon example is that in this case there is 
nothing about our evidence that could be said to cause the predicted event.  The drop in 
atmospheric pressure causes both the barometer and the rain to fall, but the barometer  
                                                          
74 See Samuel Taylor Coleridge for more on ancient mariners; particularly their rimes. 
75 The 'moon and the tides' counterexample is taken from Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.,. 47. 
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has no effect on the rain.  It follows that there is no information about the barometer that, 
in itself, could explain the rain.  However, I think it is still quite reasonable to say that 
we have performed a reasonable and scientific prediction in this case, despite the lack of 
explanatory power in our evidence.   
 It might be argued that in the barometer case we have background assumptions 
about air pressure that influence our prediction.  This could be the case, but we could 
certainly imagine having the same predictive power even if our knowledge of air 
pressure was confused or non-existent.  Imagine the person who believes that the 
mercury in the barometer falls because of an increase in the force of gravity.  The gravity 
pulls on the mercury, and when it gets strong enough it eventually "pulls" the rain out of 
the clouds.  I would want to say that this person might still be in a position to perform an 
accurate inductive inference, and thus be in a position to make a proper scientific 
prediction.   
 
Explanations as Essentially Predictive: 
 
Of more crucial importance to my thesis is the question of whether or not 
explanations are essentially predictive.  After all, if explanations that do not explicitly 
confer upon their explanans a probability of at least 50% are allowed (such as, of course, 
aleatory explanations), then there will be some explanations that could never have 
provided us with any predictive power.  Indeed, we might have good reason to predict 
that the negation of the explanans would obtain, but we could still explain it once it 
happened.  Aleatory explanations do not, therefore, satisfy the part of the symmetry 
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thesis that requires an explanation to be predictive.  Let us look at some counterexamples 
to the idea the explanations are essentially predictive. 
 One form of tertiary syphilis is paresis.  Paresis only occurs in those who have 
been through the primary, secondary and latent stages of syphilis and have not been 
treated by antibiotics.  Whenever a person contracts paresis, the explanation is that they 
have had untreated (or improperly treated) latent syphilis.  Ask any doctor or medical 
researcher why a given person has contracted paresis and they will give an explanation 
much like the one above.  However, only about 25% of people who have untreated latent 
syphilis contract paresis so one could never predict that a particular individual would 
contract the disease.  Here we have a non-predictive medical explanation that seems 
perfectly reasonable from an intuitive notion of scientific explanations.   
 Evolutionary biology has a great deal of explanatory power.  Its primary appeal 
as a scientific theory is its ability to explain not only the vast array of different 
organisms on the planet, but also to explain why particular creatures have become 
dominant within their environment.  Certain types of finch become dominant, says the 
biologist, because of genetic traits that enhance their ability to survive and reproduce.  
Despite all this, the evolutionary biologist is unable to make even remotely accurate 
predictions as to what things will be like in the future.  Given a certain isolated island at 
time t that has on it 20 species of thistle, the biologist could not tell us which, if any, of 
these thistles would become dominant over the others by t+50 years.  Indeed, the 
antecedent probability that Homo Sapiens would occupy the niche it now does was 
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probably very small indeed, but here we are, and we have the evolutionary biologist to 
give us an explanation of our position. 
 So here we have two counterexamples to the idea that explanations are 
essentially predictive.  Both of them rest on sciences that we would not want to describe 
as pseudo-sciences, both of which provide us with real and useful statistical explanations 
of particular facts.  However, it might be argued that these explanations are not 
fundamentally non-predictive, but that they are merely incomplete.  In other words, 
evolutionary biology would be capable of predicting the evolution and adaptation of 
certain species in an ideal epistemic circumstance, such that we knew everything there is 
to know about genes, traits, mating patters, weather patters, geographical information, 
and the like.  Our knowledge in all these matters is limited, but it is not limited in 
principle.  It is reasonable to think that someday we will have all the relevant facts, and 
when that day arrives, biology will have the sort of predictive power that the symmetry 
thesis requires.  According to this view, the current evolutionary explanation of life is 
really just a stop-gap explanation (not really an explanation at all) that is filling in until 
we can really understand what is going on.   
 This view of science (that is cannot offer good explanations unless it has ideal 
epistemic circumstances), is to say the least, troublesome.  All branches of science suffer 
from an epistemic shortcoming, so it therefore follows that we have no good (true) 
explanations at all.  This is certainly not the case.  We cannot completely discount the 
explanatory theories that science gives us just because human knowledge is destined to 
be imperfect.  In my chapter on aleatory explanations, I give Humphreys' argument 
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against this very point.  Furthermore, this view of the world (that with enough 
information an explanation could be predictive) seems to presuppose determinism, or at 
least presuppose that only deterministic phenomena are explicable.  As I have said many 
times, this is not an appropriate presupposition for any theory of explanation to make. 
 To strengthen the point, let me give an example of a current scientific theory that 
is, according to many (probably most) physicists, non-deterministic76.  Uranium 238 has 
a half-life of roughly 6.5 * 109 years.  This means that the probability (or chance) that a 
given atom of Uranium 238 will decay during this time period is 0.5.  So, the probability 
that this same atom will decay (thus undergoing alpha-particle emission and becoming 
an atom of lead) during any 24 hour time period is very, very small indeed.  
Furthermore, the probability involved here is, according to the quantum physicist, 
irreducibly statistical.  There is, in principle, no way to get any better knowledge of 
whether a given particle will decay in a given time period than the knowledge we can get 
by simply watching enough atoms and observing their rate of decay.  In other words, the 
6.5 * 109 year half-life is not just a "to the best of our knowledge" statistic.  It exhausts 
all of our predictive powers.  We simply cannot say anything more precise than "for any 
6.5 * 109  year time period, roughly one half of the molecules of a given sample of 
Uranium 238 will decay."  Now say that a given atom a does in fact decay during the 24 
hour period of observation.  The physicist would explain this phenomenon in terms of 
the nature of the nucleus of the isotope, and the nature of barrier penetration and alpha-
                                                          
76 As I have said before, it is not the purpose of this thesis to argue for either determinism or 
indeterminism.  I will be content to show that there are situations in which determinism is in question.  
Perhaps quantum events are governed by "hidden variables," but this is not clearly the case, so it would be 
a philosophically irresponsible to assume determinism without a good argument. 
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decay.  Further, he would add that it was very unlikely that a would decay during the day 
in question, but would nevertheless say that he understands the process through which 
the decay occurred, and might add that the improbable can be expected to happen 
sometimes (although at no particular time).  In fact, if the improbable didn't happen 
occasionally, it wouldn't be improbable, but rather impossible77. 
 So here is a case of an explanation that is essentially statistical, and that cannot 
be reduced to any more basic deterministic laws.  It seems to be a good explanation in 
that the explanans give us a good understanding of how and why the atom decayed, but 
it certainly has no predictive power.   
 It would appear that there are many cases in diverse scientific fields in which we 
have explanations that are inherently non-predictive.  In some of these (like the syphilis-
paresis or evolutionary biology cases), it might seem that our statistical explanation is 
merely taking the place of some "better" deterministic explanation, while in others (like 
the Uranium 238 case), the probabilities involved are irreducible.  Together with the 
examples of non-explanatory prediction discussed earlier, it is clear that we have 
inadequate intuitive support for the symmetry thesis.  Such a thesis would, if true, show 
many of our more convincing scientific theories and explanations to be in error, despite 
the fact that they are accepted by so many scientists, and so many philosophers of 
science (like Hempel himself) and, to quote David Lewis, "an analysis that imputes 
widespread error is prima facie implausible.  Moreover, it is dishonest to accept it, if you 
                                                          
77 That is, physically impossible, not logically impossible.  But perhaps even this usage is misleading.  At 
any rate, it might not be called impossible in any sense, but neither would it be called improbable in the 
normal sense. 
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yourself persist in the "error" when you leave the philosophy room."78  We do in fact 
accept non-predictive explanations and non-explanatory predictions from science every 
day.  We would need a much better argument than the ones Hempel gives to believe that 
we are wrong to do so. 
 
The Desire for Determinism 
 
 
As I have mentioned, it seems to me that both van Fraassen's view that 
explanations should be contrastive and Hempel's view that they should be predictive 
stem from a tacit assumption that the universe is, when all is said and done, 
deterministic.  I doubt that either of these philosophers would explicitly hold this view, 
but, as Peter Railton puts it, "Some people who do not hold the doctrine of determinism 
are nevertheless held by it."   
 It seems commonplace for most of us to forget, when we leave the philosophy 
room or the laboratory, that determinism is not the obviously correct state of things.  The 
world that presents itself to our senses on an everyday basis seems quite regular and 
deterministic, and sometimes this commonplace notion makes us forget the last one 
hundred years of physics.  The advantages of Humphreys' model of explanation should 
not be overlooked simply because they fail to meet with our anachronistic desire that 
things be rigid and deterministic.  If our naïve intuitions are correct, and the world is 
deterministic, then aleatory explanations will help us understand it.  If some of the 
prevailing scientific views of indeterminism are correct, then, presumably, aleatory 
                                                          
78 David Lewis.  "Causation." p. 175 
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explanations will help us to understand those.  The point is that the question is left to the 
scientists to decide79. 
                                                          
79 I know that I have repeated this criterion for the adequacy of an explanatory account time and time 
again, and it might seem somewhat repetitive (it is), but when I look at the literature on scientific 
explanation, this is the most important difference between the various accounts.  Many of the debates and 
disagreements regarding scientific explanations either explicitly or implicitly turn on this issue, so I want 
to be as clear as possible.  If that means a bit of repetition whenever this point recurs, then so be it. 
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CHAPTER VII  
 
ALEATORY* EXPLANATIONS 
 
I have spent the bulk of this thesis arguing that Paul Humphreys' theory of aleatory 
explanations is the correct one on which to model our scientific explanations.  The 
reasons for this are many and diverse, and have all been given in the preceding chapters.  
In this chapter I want to propose a way in which the theory can be improved over the 
presentation that Humphreys gives of it.  This is not to say that aleatory explanations 
have any sort of fatal shortcoming, only that improvement is possible.   
 
The Problem 
 
 
As mentioned above, Paul Humphreys offers the following sufficient conditions 
on one explanation being better than another.  For any two true explanatory accounts "Y 
because Φ, despite Ψ" and "Y because Φ', despite Ψ,"  
 
If Φ _ Φ' and Ψ = Ψ', then the explanation of Y by Φ' is superior to that given by Φ.  If Φ 
= Φ' and Ψ _ Ψ' then again Φ' gives a superior explanation, in the sense that it is more 
complete.80 
  
 
I have already said that he would almost certainly, based on the style of these conditions, 
accept that when Φ _ Φ' and Ψ _ Ψ', then the explanation given of Y by Φ' is superior to  
that given by Φ.  So let us take these three conditions as sufficient conditions on one 
explanation of Y being superior (better) to another explanation of Y.   
                                                          
80 "Scientific Explanation: The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing but the Causes" p. 296. 
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Obviously these are not necessary conditions on the comparative quality of an 
explanation, and so much the worse for any theory that says they are.  Surely "because of 
the speed of the car and the sand on the road, despite the functioning brakes" is a better 
explanation of a car's skidding off the road than "because of the gravitational force 
exerted on that car by Alpha Centauri," even when both are true.  But this example does 
not meet any of the above conditions.  So we know that the conditions cannot be 
necessary. 
Furthermore, the conditions cited do not tell us when an explanation is "good" or 
"bad," only when it is "better" or worse."  That both explanations are true is assumed, as 
a false "explanation" is neither better nor worse than any other explanation—it is not an 
explanation at all, but beyond that, all we can determine from the form alone is the 
relative quality of the explanation.  Science may be able to come up with objectively 
good and bad explanations, but we will actually have to know something about science 
to make this determination, not just about the form of the explanation. 
So these conditions as given are clearly not all that strong, and, it would seem, 
they match our intuitions about the quality of a causal explanation quite well.  After all, 
when causes are in question, if explanatory account A can cite all the causes that account 
B cites, plus some, then A must be a better explanation that B, at least in the sense that it 
is more complete.  That is, it gives you a better understanding about why the 
explanandum should or should not have happened. 
However, I believe I have a counterexample.  Imagine that I set up a domino-
topple consisting of 100 separate dominos.  Further, imagine that the domino-topple is 
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completely isolated, completely deterministic, and arranged such that every domino hits 
one and only one other domino in a straight line.  Further, imagine that they are spaced 
in such a way that if any of my dominos were removed (other than the last one), then the 
chain would be broken and the last one would not fall.  Okay, now imagine that I tip the 
first domino and the line topples over in the standard way, with the result that the last 
domino falls.  Now take P to be the event described by "The last (100th) domino fell," 
and Q to be the event described by "The first domino was tipped over."81  The following 
aleatory explanation seems appropriate: 
 
(A) P because Q. 
 
 
It is in the canonical form and it correctly identifies a contributing cause.  It is therefore 
a true explanation.  But now imagine that R is the event described by the sentence "The 
second domino fell."  Consider the following explanation: 
 
(B) P because R. 
 
 
Now, it would seem that we have yet another perfectly good explanation.  Certainly R 
was a cause of P by any of the standard notions of causation (either counterfactually 
"had R not occurred, P would not have either" or on a frequency theory of causation 
"whenever R falls, P does also").  In fact, it would appear that Q and R both confer the 
exact same likelihood upon the occurrence of P (in this case, that likelihood is one).  If 
either explanation is superior, I would be inclined to say it is A, simply because the 
                                                          
81 It is important the P and Q are not the sentences themselves, but rather the events described by the 
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cause Q, being temporally prior to R, and being the direct, deterministic cause of R, 
gives us more information about the events that led to P.  To use Humphreys' 
terminology82, the explanation A is a "superior explanation, in the sense that it is more 
complete."  Of course there is no way of determining their relative quality based on what 
Humphreys has given us with regard to purely formal superiority (neither Φ is a proper 
subset of the other), so we are left to our science or our intuitions, but this is no problem.  
The problem arises when we consider the explanation: 
 
(C) P because Q and R. 
 
 
C is, according to Humphreys' account, a better explanation than either A or B, since it 
cites more of the causes involved it is superior on the aleatory account.  But I do not 
think this is obvious at all.  In fact, I think that A, and C are all equally good 
explanations of the event P, while both are superior to B, since they give more of the 
causal history of P. 
 My reason for saying this is that despite the fact that C cites more causes than 
either A or B, it does not give us any better understanding of the event P than they do.  
Since R is causally implied by Q (we are assuming), that is, since all of the effects of R  
must take place whenever Q occurs (or, counterfactually, Q □→ R), saying that R 
occurred really adds nothing to the account over and above saying that Q occurred.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
sentences.  After all, Φ and Ψ are sets of causes, not sentences. 
82 Though I do not know for sure whether or not Humphreys' intuitions would agree with mine in this 
particular case 
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Though more causes are cited in C, the second cause is, in a sense, uninteresting and 
uninformative. 
 Just to make the case a bit more convincing, let me modify it a little.  Imagine S 
is the state of affairs prior to the toppling of the first domino.  A description of S would 
look something like "There are 100 dominos lined up such that if the first one falls, each 
successive one will fall deterministically, etc., resulting in the last (100th) domino 
falling."  The following three explanations are both true: 
 
(A') P because Q and S. 
 (B') P because R and S. 
 (C') P because Q and R and S. 
 
 
Here I think it is obvious that A' is better than B', again, in the sense that it is more 
complete.  By stating that Q occurred, we are saying something over and above the fact 
that R occurred.  After all, we could easily imagine R having occurred in Q's absence, 
say, if a gust of wind had tipped over the second domino but not the first.  But it seems 
equally clear to me that C' does not say anything over and above what is said by A'.  
Each explanation is equally good.  Just to drive the point home, lets look at the English 
translations of A' and C'.  A' says: 
 
The 100th domino fell over because it was the 100th out of 100 dominos, arranged such 
that if the first one were to fall all the others would be deterministically sure to fall in 
succession, right down to the 100th one, and the first one did in fact fall. 
 
 
And C' says: 
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The 100th domino fell over because it was the 100th out of 100 dominos, arranged such 
that if the first one were to fall all the others would be deterministically sure to fall in 
succession, right down to the 100th one, and the first one did in fact fall, followed by 
falling of the second domino. 
 
 
The final clause of the second explanation adds absolutely nothing to the explanation 
that is not already present, and hence, I do not think we would be justified in calling C' a 
better explanation than A'.  If there are those who disagree, and see C' as somehow a 
more complete account, giving a better understanding of the explanandum, I do not 
know if I can do more to convince them.  Regardless, my intuitions strongly favor the 
claim that A' and C' are equally good explanations of the event P. 
 
The Solution 
 
So we clearly have a problem with the account of aleatory explanations as it 
stands.  Though Humphreys model is the best out of all those I have examined, it needs 
some modification regarding its handling of the comparative quality of explanations.  I 
think I can give just such a modification. 
 I said that the problem with regarding C' to be a better explanation than A' is that 
the account given by C' adds nothing to the account given by A'.  The reason that this is 
the case, it seems, is that the sentences describing Q and S logically entail the sentence 
describing R.  This should be clear if you go back and read the spelled-out English 
version of the explanation C'.  From the proposition, "There were 100 dominos, arranged 
such that if the first one were to fall all the others would be deterministically sure to fall 
in succession, right down to the 100th one," and the proposition "The first domino fell," it 
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should be a simple matter of logic to infer that the second domino fell as well.  If we 
understand 'determinism' and the notion of 'falling in succession', then the inference 
should be pretty straightforward: 
 
For all Dn, where 1[n[100, if Dn-1 falls, then Dn falls.   
D1 falls. 
Therefore, D2 falls. 
 
 
So it is clear that R (which is just the conclusion of this argument) is logically entailed 
by S and Q (which are the premises).  One might object that such an inference assumes 
determinism, and hence it is not true that the falling of domino one entails the falling of 
domino two.  But this, while true, does nothing to block the inference, since the 
additional premise S is involved, in which determinism is explicitly assumed.  Sure, 
there are possible worlds in which the first domino falls and the second does not, but 
these are not worlds in which the premises of the argument (which are just statements of 
the causes in our explanation) are true, so they need not concern us.  Furthermore, my 
earlier qualms with essentially deterministic explanations still obtain, but that does not 
prevent me from stipulating that determinism is true in a particular instance.   
 So, it would appear that the real problem with thinking that explanations A' and 
C' could be better or worse than one another is that an accurate description of the causes 
they mention shows that the set Φ in each explanation is logically entailed by the set Φ 
in the other.  This leads me directly into how to solve the problem with Humphreys' 
account.  The sufficient conditions on the superiority of an explanation Φ' should be 
amended as follows: 
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If Φ _ Φ' and Ψ = Ψ', then the explanation of Y by Φ' is superior to that given by Φ, 
unless a complete description of the elements of Φ entails a description of the elements 
of Φ'.   
If Φ = Φ' and Ψ _ Ψ' then again Φ' gives a superior explanation, in the sense that it is 
more complete, unless a complete description of the elements of Ψ entails a description 
of the elements of Ψ'.   
If Φ _ Φ' and Ψ _ Ψ', then the explanation of Y by Φ' is superior to that given by Φ, 
unless a complete description of the elements of Φ and Ψ entails a description of the 
elements of Φ' and Ψ'. 
 
 
Although I have only discussed the problem of logical entailment as it regards 
contributing cases, it should be obvious that a similar problem confronts counteracting 
causes, and that it can be solved in the manner described above.  Further, you will notice 
that I have made explicit the condition (which I am sure Humphreys would assent to) 
that when Φ and Ψ are both proper subsets of Φ' and Ψ', respectively, then the 
explanation given by Φ' is superior to that given by Φ (plus, of course, the unless-clause 
that I have added).   
I contend that the above modification of Humphreys’ model of aleatory 
explanations is necessary in order for it to properly preserve our intuitions regarding the 
relative quality of scientific explanations.  I cannot say, however, whether or not 
Humphreys would agree with my intuitions or my conclusions in this matter, so from 
here on, I will refer to my modified version of his model as aleatory* explanation, and 
let 'aleatory explanations' continue to refer to the view Humphreys himself presents us 
with.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In conclusion, I feel that I have given a number of convincing reasons why the 
traditional models of scientific explanation are inferior to the account of aleatory 
explanations given by Paul Humphreys.  Aleatory explanations are causally oriented, 
non-inferential linguistic devices that rigidly determine what counts as true and false 
explanations in science.  They allow for the essential incompleteness of scientific 
discourse, and hence no explanation that fits the model will ever be complete and yet 
many of them are still true, and good sense can be made of one such explanation's being 
superior to another.  Further, they have no requirement of maximal specificity or other 
such restriction that would block all by the most trivial explanations.  Aleatory 
explanations are not essentially contrastive, nor are they predictive, but this is a distinct 
advantage, since they do not thereby imply determinism.   
However, I have pointed out that there is a slight difficulty involved regarding 
the sufficient conditions that Humphreys gives of one explanation's being superior to 
another.  I corrected this problem and titled the revised account aleatory* explanation.  
Since it would appear that aleatory* explanations have all the advantages of aleatory 
explanations, but one less disadvantage, I contend that the revised account is superior to 
all of the standard models of scientific explanation.  It is, I believe, at least a very close 
approximation of the correct view of scientific explanation, corresponding both to our 
intuitions about explanations and to the actual practice of science. 
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